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COMMENTS 
SUMMARY EXHIBITS AND THE 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: LOOKING 
BEYOND THE HEARSAY RULE FOR 






The Confrontation Clause provides, “In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him.”1  This right is afforded to defendants in criminal cases by giving them 
the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who testify against them.  
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the purpose of the Confrontation 
Clause is to “ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal 
defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary 
proceeding before the trier of fact.”2  However, before the Court’s 2004 
decision in Crawford v. Washington, criminal defendants were not 
guaranteed an opportunity to cross-examine a witness’s out-of-court 
statement against them if the statement fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay 
exception” or was otherwise considered reliable.3  Crawford effectively 
severed the relationship between the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation 
Clause and the hearsay rule, holding that a defendant’s right to 
confrontation can only be satisfied when the defendant has the opportunity 




* J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2012; B.S. in Accounting and Finance, 
University of Illinois at Chicago, 2006. 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
2 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990). 
3 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 
56, 66 (1980)). 
4 Id. at 59. 
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After Crawford, the Court has made numerous attempts to 
categorically distinguish statements that trigger the confrontation right from 
statements that do not.  Most of Crawford’s progeny have attempted to 
distinguish “testimonial” statements, which trigger Confrontation Clause 
protections under the new standard, from “non-testimonial” statements, 
which do not receive constitutional scrutiny.
5
  More recently, the Court has 
begun to address how and whether Crawford’s progeny dictate which 
witnesses the government must call when confronting criminal defendants 
with their accusers.
6
  The Supreme Court has yet to address whether charts, 
summaries, and calculations of voluminous data are testimonial.  Such 
evidence is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 1006.  
However, if this evidence is testimonial, the fact that it is admissible under 
FRE 1006 should not protect it from Sixth Amendment scrutiny.  Under 
Crawford, the Confrontation Clause should prohibit the admission of a 
testimonial summary exhibit  unless the defendant is given the opportunity 
to cross-examine the individuals whose assertions are contained in the 
summary evidence.  To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the 
Court’s decision in Crawford, which effectively segregated the 
determination of evidentiary admissibility from the determination of 
constitutional admissibility. 
As courts continue to define the contours of the Sixth Amendment, the 
same concerns that led the Court to sever the hearsay rule from the 
Confrontation Clause will eventually require it to address whether the 
admission of testimonial summary exhibits raises Confrontation Clause 
concerns when the defendant is not afforded the opportunity to confront the 
individuals who made the assertions contained in the summaries. 
Part II of this Comment contains a brief history of our Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence.  Part II also provides a general overview of FRE 
1006, which allows for the admissibility of summary exhibits.  The right to 
confrontation can be traced back to long before the founding of this 
country.  However, recent developments in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence 
have significantly expanded the scope of the right.  Part III of this Comment 
explores the relationship between FRE 1006, the hearsay regime, and the 
Confrontation Clause.  A summary exhibit can be testimonial in the same 
way certain hearsay statements are testimonial.  This section of the 
 
5 See, e.g., Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828–29 
(2006). 
6 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710 (holding that the Confrontation Clause is violated where 
the prosecution introduces a forensic lab report through the in-court testimony of an analyst 
who did not sign the certification or personally perform or observe the performance of the 
test reported in the certification). 
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Comment discusses why courts should subject testimonial summary 
exhibits to the same degree of constitutional scrutiny as testimonial hearsay 
evidence.  In Part IV, this Comment explores how the Supreme Court’s 
fractured decision in Williams v. Illinois
7
 has confounded the Court’s 
otherwise steady Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, and how that decision 
could impact whether summary exhibits receive constitutional scrutiny.  
Part V provides a conclusion to this Comment, asserting that the admission 
of testimonial summary exhibits without the right to cross-examination 
violates the Confrontation Clause under Crawford. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE BEFORE CRAWFORD 
A defendant’s right to face his accuser has its roots in Roman law.  
The Roman governor Porcius Festus famously said of his prisoner, Paul the 
Apostle, “[i]t is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man to die, 
before that he which is accused have the accusers face to face, and have 
license to answer for himself concerning the crime laid against him.”8  In 
English common law, the tragic story of Sir Walter Raleigh is often cited to 
illustrate the importance of being able to face one’s accusers.9 
In the United States, the right to confrontation has been codified in the 
Sixth Amendment of the Constitution.  “In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him.”10  The Roman and traditional English models differ from the Sixth 
Amendment in that the former provide only the right to face one’s accuser, 
while the latter provides the right to face not only one’s accuser, but also 
any adverse witnesses.
11
  The Supreme Court held in Pointer v. Texas that 
the confrontation right applied to the states through the Fourteenth 
 
7 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). 
8 Acts 25:16 (King James); see also id. at 23:35 (“I will hear thee, said he, when thine 
accusers are also come.  And he commanded him to be kept in Herod’s judgment hall.”). 
9 See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.  Sir Walter Raleigh was accused of treason by Lord 
Cobham, his alleged accomplice.  Raleigh argued that Cobham lied to save himself and 
demanded that he be brought forth.  The judges denied Sir Walter Raleigh the opportunity to 
confront Cobham, his accuser, and the jury convicted Raleigh, who was then sentenced to 
death.  Id. 
10 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
11 Another subtle but significant difference between Roman law and the Sixth 
Amendment is the Sixth Amendment’s passive phrasing.  Id. (“[T]he accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” (emphasis added)).  The 
passive phrasing makes clear that the burden is on the prosecution to produce those 
witnesses. 
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Amendment.
12
  Before Crawford, the Sixth Amendment and the hearsay 
rule “dealt with the problem of the reliability of second-hand evidence in 
much the same way.”13  Secondhand statements offered against criminal 
defendants were presumed reliable if they fell within a “firmly rooted 
hearsay exception.”14  If a firmly rooted hearsay exception applied, the 
confrontation right did not attach.
15
 
The most recent articulation of this position was in the Supreme 
Court’s 1980 decision, Ohio v. Roberts.16  In Roberts, the Court held that a 
witness’s out-of-court statement may be admitted against a criminal 
defendant without opportunity for cross-examination if the statement bears 
adequate indicia of reliability.
17
  To meet that test, evidence had to either 
fall within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bear “particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness.”18 
B. CRAWFORD AND ITS PROGENY 
In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court overruled Roberts and 
severed the Confrontation Clause from the hearsay rule,
19
 holding that the 
confrontation right will no longer be satisfied simply because a statement 
against the accused falls within a hearsay exception or bears “indicia of 
reliability.”20  In Crawford, the defendant was tried for the assault and 
attempted murder of a man who allegedly raped his wife.
21
  At trial, the 
State played for the jury a tape-recorded statement that the defendant’s wife 
made to the police.
22
  The defendant did not have the opportunity to cross-
examine his wife because Washington’s marital privilege rule barred a 
spouse from testifying without the other spouse’s consent.23  However, 
 
12 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). 
13 G. Michael Fenner, Today’s Confrontation Clause (After Crawford and Melendez-
Diaz), 43 CREIGHTON. L. REV. 35, 37 (2009). 
14 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 65 (“The Court has applied this ‘indicia of reliability’ requirement principally by 
concluding that certain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that admission of 
virtually any evidence within them comports with the ‘substance of the constitutional 
protection.’” (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895))). 
18 Id. at 66. 
19 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004) (“Where testimonial statements 
are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection 
to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of reliability.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
20 Id. at 68. 
21 Id. at 38. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 40. 
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privilege did not extend to a spouse’s out-of-court statements admissible 
under a hearsay exception.
24
  This allowed the State to admit the tape-




The defendant argued that—notwithstanding the state marital privilege 
and evidence laws—admitting the taped statements would violate his Sixth 
Amendment right to be “confronted with the witnesses against him.”26  
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio v. Roberts, the trial court 
admitted the statements over the defendant’s objections on the basis that the 
defendant’s wife’s statements bore “particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.”27  The jury convicted the defendant of assault.28  On 
appeal, Washington’s higher courts avoided the constitutional question, 




In a watershed opinion, the Supreme Court overturned its decision in 
Ohio v. Roberts, holding that while “the [Confrontation] Clause’s ultimate 
goal is to ensure reliability of evidence . . . it is a procedural rather than a 
substantive guarantee,”30 which can only be satisfied by providing the 
accused an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him, 
regardless of whether that witness’s statement falls within a hearsay 
exception.
31
  Because the defendant in Crawford was not afforded the 
opportunity to cross-examine his wife, the Court held that this right was 




The result from Crawford was an “expanded . . . category of cases in 
which the hearsay rules will allow—but the Confrontation Clause will 
prohibit—the introduction of an out-of-court statement.”33  Justice Scalia, 
who wrote the Crawford opinion, stated that it is not enough for the 
statement to be reliable, but that this “reliability [needed to] be assessed in a 






28 Id. at 41. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 61. 
31 Id. (“[The Confrontation Clause] commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that 
reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination.”). 
32 Id. at 68–69. 
33 David A. Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 5. 
34 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. 
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According to Crawford, “the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy 
constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: 
confrontation.”35 
While Crawford marked the beginning of a much broader construction 
of the Sixth Amendment, the Court placed an important limitation on the 
types of statements that would be inadmissible without confrontation.  The 
defendant’s right to cross-examine applies only to “testimonial” statements 
offered against the accused in a criminal prosecution to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted.
36
  In other words, the right is not implicated when: (1) 
the statement is being offered for a purpose other than to prove the truth of 
its contents;
37
 (2) the statement is not offered in a criminal prosecution 
against the accused;
38
 or (3) the statement is not testimonial.
39
 
Because Crawford failed to lay out a comprehensive definition of 
testimonial,
40
 the most difficult challenge in the post-Crawford 
Confrontation Clause analysis has been the determination of whether a 
statement is testimonial. 
The Court’s first attempt to define testimonial after Crawford came in 
the 2006 case of Davis v. Washington.
41
  In Davis, the Court articulated the 
“primary purpose” test for determining whether a statement is testimonial 
for Sixth Amendment purposes.
42
  Under this test, it does not matter who 
made the statement, through what medium the statement was transmitted, or 
to whom the statement was made.
43
  Whether the statement is testimonial 
depends on why the statement was made.  If the purpose of the statement 
was to respond to an ongoing emergency, then the statement is non-
testimonial.
44
  However, if the purpose of the statement was to further an 
 
35 Id. at 69. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 59 n.9 (“The Clause also does not bar the use of testimonial statements for 
purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” (citing Tennessee v. Street, 
471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985))).  Examples include statements offered to demonstrate the effect 
upon the listener, to impeach a prior inconsistent statement, and to provide context to non-
hearsay evidence. 
38 This limitation derives from the text of the Sixth Amendment itself: “In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
39 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
40 Id. at 68. (“We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition 
of ‘testimonial.’”).  The Court acknowledged that a refusal to articulate a comprehensive 
definition would cause uncertainty in the interim, but argued that such uncertainty could 
hardly be any worse than the status quo under Roberts.  Id. at 68 n.10. 
41 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
42 Id. at 822. 
43 Fenner, supra note 13, at 49–50. 
44 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
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investigation for criminal prosecution, the statement is testimonial and the 
declarant is subject to cross-examination.
45
  Other circumstantial facts, such 
as the declarant, listener, and medium, are only relevant insofar as they shed 
light on the primary purpose of the statement.
46
 
Under this test, consecutive statements made by the same declarant to 
the same listener may receive different treatment under the Sixth 
Amendment if the purpose of the statement changes in the middle of the 
conversation.
47
  In Davis, for example, statements made to a police officer 
over a 911 call were held to be non-testimonial because they were made 
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
statements was to enable the police to assist in an ongoing emergency.
48
  
Statements made minutes later to officers who secured the scene were held 
to be testimonial because the primary purpose had shifted from addressing 
the emergency to establishing or proving past events potentially relevant to 
later criminal prosecution.
49
  Davis made clear that the Court would not rely 
on rigid classifications based on the identity of the speaker or listener, the 
timing, or the mode of transmission to determine whether a statement is 
testimonial.
50
  Instead, it would rely on these attributes to provide context in 
order to determine the purpose of the statement. 
In 2009, the Court’s opinion in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts51 
marked a significant expansion in the scope of the Confrontation Clause.  In 
Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court held that a crime lab analyst’s 
certificates were testimonial and that the defendant’s right to confrontation 
was violated because he did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the 
lab analyst.
52
  In Melendez-Diaz, the defendant was arrested for the 
possession of what appeared to be cocaine.
53
  The seized substance was 
submitted to a state laboratory required by law to conduct chemical analysis 
upon police request.
54




47 Fenner, supra note 13, at 52. 
48 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
49 Id.  There is still some debate as to whose primary purpose should be considered when 
determining whether a statement is testimonial.  For an illuminating discussion on this, see 
Fenner, supra note 13, at 52–59. 
50 See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (reaching its holding “without attempting to produce an 
exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements”); see also United States v. Summers, 
414 F.3d 1287, 1300 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court declined to rigidly define what 
is meant by the term ‘testimonial.’”). 
51 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
52 Id. at 2542. 
53 Id. at 2530. 
54 Id. 
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analysis” showing the results of the forensic analysis performed on the 
seized substances.
55
  The certificates, which were sworn before a notary 
public, reported the weight of the bags and stated that the substance in the 
bags contained cocaine.
56
  The defendant objected to the admission of the 
certificates, asserting that the Court’s decision in Crawford required the 
analyst to testify and be cross-examined.
57
  The objection was overruled, the 
certificates were admitted into evidence, and a jury found the defendant 
guilty of distributing cocaine.
58
 
On appeal, the defendant contended that the admission of the 
certificates violated his Sixth Amendment right to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him.
59
  After the Appeals Court of Massachusetts rejected 
the defendant’s claim and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied 
review, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
60
  In a 5-to-4 decision, 
the Court held that the crime lab’s certificates were testimonial because 
they were prepared in anticipation of criminal prosecution and were 
“affidavits” against the defendant.61 
Melendez-Diaz expanded the confrontation right by broadening the 
meaning of the phrase “witnesses against him” in the Sixth Amendment.  
The Court held that anyone providing testimonial evidence against the 
defendant, including a crime lab analyst, is a “witness against” the accused 
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.
62
  Now, in order to admit such 
certificates, the government must demonstrate the analyst’s unavailability 
 






61 Id. at 2532.  There is a potential conflict between the primary purpose test articulated 
in Davis and Melendez-Diaz.  Many lab reports, autopsies, and DNA tests are not performed 
with litigation in mind, and are therefore non-testimonial, even if those records later come to 
be used in a criminal prosecution.  See, e.g., Sanders v. Commonwealth, 711 S.E.2d 213, 
214, 219–20 (Va. 2011) (holding that the admission of a lab report indicating the victim 
contracted sexually transmitted diseases did not violate the accused’s right to confrontation 
because the report was created for medical treatment purposes rather than forensic 
investigation purposes; the fact that the Commonwealth sought to use the report in a criminal 
prosecution later did not change its non-testimonial character).
  
This leads to the arguably 
bizarre outcome of the same types of lab results, derived from the same set of tests, 
conducted by the same analyst, using the same set of procedures, and with the same chances 
of mistake, receiving different treatment even though the analyst is in both cases a “witness” 
against the defendant. 
62 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 2532. 
2012] SUMMARY EXHIBITS 859 
and show that the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.
63
  
Otherwise, the defendant has the right to confront the analyst at trial.
64
 
In a lengthy dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy—joined by Justice 
Alito, Justice Breyer, and Chief Justice Roberts—argued that crime lab 
analysts should not be considered witnesses for the purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause.
65
  According to the dissent, crime lab analysts are not 
witnesses in the traditional sense for three reasons.  First, they do not recall 
events they actually observed in the past, but instead make near-
contemporaneous observations.
66
  Second, crime lab analysts do not 
observe a crime or any human action related to it.
67
  Third, they do not 
provide statements in response to interrogation.
68
  The dissent also 
expressed practicability concerns, arguing that the decision will impose a 
significant burden on prosecutors while providing little substantive benefit 
to criminal defendants.
69
  Critics of the Melendez-Diaz decision have 
echoed these concerns and gone further to make slippery slope arguments, 
questioning whether DNA analyses, breathalyzer tests, ballistic tests, and 




In a recent Confrontation Clause decision, Bullcoming v. New 
Mexico,
71
 the Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of testimonial 
assertions where the maker of the assertions is someone other than the 
person available for cross-examination by the defendant.
72
  In Bullcoming, 
the defendant, Donald Bullcoming, was charged with and convicted of 
 
63 Id. (“Absent a showing that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and that 
petitioner had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them, petitioner was entitled to be 
confronted with the analysts at trial.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
64 Id. 
65 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2550–51 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
66 Id. at 2551. 
67 Id. at 2552. 
68 Id. 
69 See id. at 2544.  Justice Scalia responded to concerns over judicial economy in his 
majority opinion: “Perhaps the best indication that the sky will not fall after today’s decision 
is that . . . [m]any States have already adopted the constitutional rule we announce 
today . . . [yet] there is no evidence that the criminal justice system has ground to a halt in 
[these States].”  Id. at 2540–41 (majority opinion). 
70 Deborah L. Meyer, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts: What the Expanded 
Confrontation Clause Ruling Means for Computer Forensics and Electronic Discovery, 28 
TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 243, 272–73 (2009); Amber N. Gremillion, Note, I’ll Be 
Seeing You in Court: Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts’ Flawed Decision and Its Impact on 
Louisiana, 37 S.U. L. REV. 255, 271 (2010). 
71 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011), rev’g State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1 (N.M. 2010). 
72 Id. at 2711. 
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driving while intoxicated (DWI).
73
  The principal evidence against 
Bullcoming was a forensic laboratory report certifying that his blood-
alcohol concentration (BAC) was well above the threshold for aggravated 
DWI.
74
  Because the scientist who performed the laboratory tests, Cutis 
Caylor, was placed on unpaid leave before trial,
75
 the State proposed to 
introduce Caylor’s findings as a business record through the testimony of 
one of the lab’s other scientists, Gerasimos Razatos.76  Razatos had neither 
participated in, observed, nor reviewed Caylor’s analysis.77 
At Bullcoming’s trial, which took place before the Supreme Court 
decided Melendez-Diaz,
78
 Bullcoming’s counsel objected to the State’s 
proposal, arguing that without an opportunity to cross-examine Caylor, the 
introduction of the lab report would violate Bullcoming’s Sixth Amendment 
right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.
79
  The trial court 
overruled the objection and admitted the report as a business record.
80
  The 
jury convicted Bullcoming of aggravated DWI, and the New Mexico Court 
of Appeals affirmed.
81




While the appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.
83
  In light of Melendez-Diaz, the New 
Mexico Supreme Court held the lab reports produced at Bullcoming’s trial 
qualified as testimonial evidence because they were “functionally identical 
to live, in-court testimony, doing precisely what a witness does on direct 
examination.”84  Nevertheless the court found that for two reasons, the 
admission of the report did not violate the Confrontation Clause.
85
  First, the 
court said that Caylor, the certifying analyst, was a “mere scrivener” who 
“simply transcribed the results generated by the [lab equipment].”86  
Second, the court found that although Razatos did not participate in testing 
 
73 Id. at 2709. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 2711–12. 




80 Id.  The trial judge noted that when he began practicing law, “there were no breath 
tests or blood tests.  They just brought in the cop, and the cop said, ‘Yeah, he was drunk.’”  
Id. at 2712 n.3. 
81 Id. at 2712. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id.  
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 2713 (quoting State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 8–9 (N.M. 2010)). 
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Bullcoming’s blood, he “qualified as an expert witness with respect to the 
[lab equipment].”87  The New Mexico Supreme Court ultimately held that 
“Bullcoming’s right of confrontation was preserved” because Razatos was 
able to serve as a “surrogate” for Caylor.88 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the 
Confrontation Clause permits the introduction of a testimonial forensic 
laboratory report through the in-court testimony of an analyst who did not 
sign the certification or personally perform or observe the performance of 
the test reported in the certification.
89
  Divided along essentially the same 
lines as the Melendez-Diaz Court,
90
 the Bullcoming Court held five to four 
that “[a]s a rule, if an out-of-court statement is testimonial in nature, it may 
not be introduced against the accused at trial unless the witness who made 
the statement is unavailable and the accused has had a prior opportunity to 
confront that witness.”91 
At the outset, the Court rejected the notion that surrogate testimony 
was adequate to satisfy Bullcoming’s confrontation right simply because 
Caylor’s work involved routine tasks and reading output from a machine.92  
According to the Court, the representations in Caylor’s report—that he 
“received Bullcoming’s blood sample intact with the seal unbroken, that he 
checked to make sure that the forensic report number and the sample 
number corresponded, . . . that he performed on Bullcoming’s sample a 
particular test, adhering to a precise protocol,” and that no circumstance or 
condition affected the integrity of the sample or the validity of the 
analysis—related to “past events and human actions [that are] not revealed 
in raw, machine-produced data . . . .”93  Most witnesses, concluded the 
Court, “testify to their observations of factual conditions or events.”94  This 
includes witnesses who relay the output of instruments and mechanical 
equipment.
95
  The Court concluded that to hold that a testimonial report 
 
87 Id. (quoting Bullcoming, 226 P.3d at 9). 
88 Id. (quoting Bullcoming, 226 P.3d at 10). 
89 Id. 
90 The prevailing opinion was joined by all of the Justices from the Melendez-Diaz 
majority plus Justice Sotomayor, who replaced Justice Stevens; Justice Stevens was a part of 
the majority in Melendez-Diaz.  The same Justices who dissented in Melendez-Diaz—
Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Alito, and the Chief Justice—also dissented in Bullcoming. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 2714–15. 
93 Id. at 2714. 
94 Id. 
95 The Court referred to observations such as “the light was green,” “the hour was noon,” 
or the reading from a radar gun as examples.  To illustrate its concern, the Court asked, 
rhetorically, “[c]ould an officer other than the one who saw the number on the . . . [radar] 
gun present the information in court—so long as that officer was equipped to testify about 
862 KARIM BASARIA [Vol. 102 
does not implicate the Sixth Amendment by virtue of it being drawn from 
machine-produced data would be flatly inconsistent with Crawford’s 
holding that “the obvious reliability of a testimonial statement does not 
dispense with the Confrontation Clause.”96 
The Supreme Court also rejected the state court’s second rationale for 
admitting the BAC report, that Razatos could substitute for Caylor because 
he qualified as an expert.
97
  “[S]urrogate testimony of the kind Razatos was 
equipped to give,” according to the Court, “could not convey what Caylor 
knew or observed about the events his certification concerned . . . .”98  
Because Bullcoming’s counsel never had the opportunity to cross-examine 
Caylor, Bullcoming was unable to probe the “particular test and testing 
process he employed” or “expose any lapses or lies on [his] part.”99  The 
Court also noted that Bullcoming’s counsel was unable to ask “questions 
designed to reveal whether incompetence, evasiveness, or dishonesty” 
accounted for Caylor being placed on unpaid leave.
100
  This, according to 
the Court, constituted a deprivation of Bullcoming’s Sixth Amendment 
right to “be confronted with the witnesses against him.”101  As the Court 
continues to define the scope and meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the 
focus of its inquiries has primarily been whether statements that would have 
been admissible under either a hearsay exception or statutory provision in 




Though Crawford fundamentally transformed Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence, it did not contemplate the type of witness who would present 
a summary exhibit.  However, in light of Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, a 
challenge to the admissibility of testimonial summary exhibits without 
confrontation could be successful. 
 
any technology the observing officer deployed and the police department’s standard 
operating procedures?”  Id. at 2714–15. 





101 Id. at 2716. 
102 See e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531 (2009) (concerning 
lab reports originally admissible pursuant to state law as “prima facie evidence of the 
composition, quality, and net weight of the narcotic . . . analyzed”); Davis v. Washington, 
547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006) (holding that the admission of statements under the present sense 
impression exception was a violation of the defendant’s confrontation right where the 
defendant did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the witness who made the 
statements). 
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C. SUMMARY EXHIBITS, GENERALLY 
According to Federal Rule of Evidence 1006: 
The proponent may use a summary, chart, or calculation to prove the content of 
voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be conveniently 
examined in court.  The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs 
which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a 
chart, summary, or calculation.  The proponent must make the originals or duplicates 
available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time 
and place.  And the court may order the proponent to produce them in court.
103
 
The language of the rule sets forth four requirements for the admission of 
summaries.  First, the materials underlying the summary must be 
voluminous; second, the summary itself must be accurate and authentic; 
third, the underlying materials must be admissible;
104
 and fourth, the 
underlying materials must be made available to the opposing party within a 
reasonable amount of time.  Additionally, courts are in agreement that 
summary exhibits may only be used to summarize evidence in the form of 
writings, recordings, and photographs, and that they may not be used to 
summarize testimony from the instant case in lieu of presenting the 
testimony itself.
105
  A summary exhibit must also be properly introduced 




















  Summary exhibits are especially appropriate 
 
103 FED. R. EVID. 1006.  The language of FRE 1006 was amended effective December 
2011.  Per the commentary to amendment, “[t]hese changes are intended to be stylistic only.  
There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.” 
104 See, e.g., Peat, Inc. v. Vanguard Research, Inc., 378 F.3d 1154, 1160 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(“Rule 1006 is not a back-door vehicle for the introduction of evidence which is otherwise 
inadmissible.”).  The party offering the summary need not offer the underlying data into 
evidence.  See, e.g., Air Safety, Inc. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Bos., 94 F.3d 1, 7 
n.14 (1st Cir. 1996); Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 41 F.3d 182, 
189 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 736 (4th Cir. 1991)). 
105 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150, 1156 (4th Cir. 1995). 
106 United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 545 (6th Cir. 2008). 
107 United States v. Loney, 959 F.2d 1332, 1336–37 (5th Cir. 1992) (wire fraud); United 
States v. Bentley, 825 F.2d 1104, 1108–09 (7th Cir. 1987) (mail fraud); United States v. 
Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 816 (11th Cir. 1984) (Medicare fraud). 
108 United States v. Howard, 774 F.2d 838, 843–44 (7th Cir. 1985). 
109 United States v. Possick, 849 F.2d 332, 339 (8th Cir. 1988). 
110 United States v. Ollison, 555 F.3d 152, 162 (5th Cir. 2009). 
111 State v. Skatzes, 819 N.E.2d 215, 250 (Ohio 2004). 
112 United States v. Fullwood, 342 F.3d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 204–05 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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where the underlying material is in the nature of financial records, accounts, 
business transactions, or other records of a detailed or complicated 
nature.
114
  Of course, the operation of FRE 1006 is not confined to such 




It is important to understand the difference between summary exhibits 
admitted under FRE 1006 and demonstrative or pedagogical summaries 
admitted under FRE 611(a).
116
  While some courts have acknowledged that 
the distinctions are not always clear,
117
 the Sixth Circuit has explained that 
there are three classes of summary exhibits: (1) FRE 1006 “primary 
evidence summaries,” which are exhibits where the summary itself, not the 
underlying documents, is evidence to be considered by the fact finder; (2) 
purely “pedagogical summaries” under FRE 611(a), which are intended to 
summarize, clarify, or simplify other evidence admitted in the case, but 
which are not themselves admitted; and (3) “secondary evidence 
summaries,” which are a combination of the first two, in that they are not 
prepared entirely for compliance with FRE 1006, but are more than mere 




113 See, e.g., United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2009) (bribery); United 
States v. Leon-Reyes, 177 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 1999) (perjury); United States v. Mass. Mar. 
Acad., 762 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1985) (asbestos litigation). 
114 See, e.g., United States v. Stoecker, 215 F.3d 788, 792 (7th Cir. 2000) (admitting 
charts summarizing pledges of single groups of stock as security for loans from banks); 
Fagiola v. Nat’l Gypsum Co. AC & S., 906 F.2d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 1990) (admitting summary 
of sales of asbestos products based on thirty-year-old fragmentary sales documents); Kroll v. 
United States, 433 F.2d 1282, 1289–90 (5th Cir. 1970) (admitting charts summarizing 
business records of a mortgage company). 
115 See, e.g., United States v. Atchley, 699 F.2d 1055, 1059 (11th Cir. 1983) (invoking 
FRE 1006 in approving receipt in evidence of chart summarizing telephone toll records); 
Nichols v. Upjohn Co., 610 F.2d 293, 293–94 (5th Cir. 1980) (admitting testimonial 
summary of investigative findings set out in 94,000-page new drug application). 
116 FED. R. EVID. 611(a).  The rule directs courts to “exercise reasonable control over the 
mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make those 
procedures effective for determining the truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect 
witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.”  Though the rule does not address 
pedagogical summaries specifically, Rule 611(a) is considered the basis for their admission.  
See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150, 1157 (4th Cir. 1995). 
117 United States v. Swanquist, 161 F.3d 1064, 1072–73 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Wood, 943 F.2d 1048, 1053–54 (9th Cir. 1991). 
118 United States v. Bray, 139 F.3d 1104, 1112 (6th Cir. 1998); see also James Lockhart, 
Annotation, Admissibility of Summaries or Charts of Writings, Recordings, or Photographs 
Under Rule 1006 of Federal Rules of Evidence, 198 A.L.R. FED. 427, § 2(b) (2004) (“Courts 
have often stressed the need to distinguish Fed. R. Evid. 1006 ‘factual’ or ‘evidentiary’ 
summaries from ‘demonstrative’ or ‘pedagogical’ summaries; although they have also 
pointed out that the distinction is not always clear, since it is possible for the material 
actually proffered to be more in the nature of a ‘hybrid’ serving both functions.”). 
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FRE 1006 summaries are different from FRE 611(a) demonstrative aids not 
because of the contents of the exhibits themselves, but rather because of the 
purposes they are intended to serve.
119
  Exhibits intended to be evidentiary 
substitutes for voluminous materials are admissible under FRE 1006.  




Demonstrative aids under FRE 611(a) are not subject to the criteria 
listed in FRE 1006.
121
  This gives the proponents of demonstrative aids 
more latitude with the information they place in exhibits.  Proponents of 
demonstrative aids need not establish the admissibility of the underlying 
data, and are usually provided more leeway to include inferences drawn 
from the underlying data that would be inadmissible under FRE 1006.
122
  
Nevertheless, the proponent of a demonstrative aid is somewhat limited in 
the extent of the inferences that may be drawn and the amount of emphasis 
that can be placed on specific information.
123
  Demonstrative aids are also 
limited in that they may not reflect evidence not admitted at trial.
124
 
In contrast, FRE 1006 summaries not only serve as vehicles to provide 
the jury with succinct presentations of otherwise complex evidence, they 
also are, unlike demonstrative exhibits under FRE 611(a), accepted as 
substantive evidence themselves.
125
  While this distinction is important, 
there may admittedly be little difference, from the jury’s perspective, 
between a summary admitted as substantive evidence under FRE 1006 and 
a demonstrative or pedagogical aid that summarizes and clarifies testimony.  
The court may provide a limiting instruction informing the jury that a 
demonstrative summary under FRE 611(a) is not itself evidence,
126
 but 
there is doubt as to whether juries are able to cognitively make the 




119 United States v. Winn, 948 F.2d 145, 159 (5th Cir. 1991). 
120 Id. at 158. 
121 See Lockhart, supra note 118, § 2(b). 
122 Id. 
123 United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 738 (4th Cir. 1991). 
124 United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 205 (3d Cir. 1992). 
125 See Lockhart, supra note 118, § 2(b). 
126 Id. (“It is necessary to give appropriate limiting instructions informing the jury that 
the summary [under 611(a)] itself is not evidence, and that it must disregard the summary to 
whatever extent it determines the summary to be inconsistent with, or not supported by, the 
actual evidence.”).  See, e.g., Daniel v. Ben E. Keith Co., 97 F.3d 1329, 1335 (10th Cir. 
1996) (citing Gomez v. Great Lakes Steel Div., Nat’l Steel Corp., 803 F.2d 250, 258 (6th 
Cir. 1986)). 
127 See, e.g., Robert R. Calo, Joint Trials, Spillover Prejudice, and the Ineffectiveness of 
a Bare Limiting Instruction, 9 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 21, 25 (1985) (stating that “there are 
some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so 
great and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. FRE 1006 AND THE HEARSAY RULE 
Inquiries under Crawford and its progeny have centered on 
confrontation issues related to otherwise admissible hearsay evidence.
128
  
For this reason, summary exhibits under FRE 1006 have yet to be 
scrutinized under the Confrontation Clause.  Perhaps this should not come 
as a surprise since the purpose of Crawford was to sever the substantive 
guarantees of reliability embodied in the hearsay exceptions from the 
procedural guarantee to test that reliability secured by the Sixth 
Amendment.  However, as Confrontation Clause jurisprudence develops, 
the Court will inevitably have to address whether summaries—specifically 
those that are testimonial—are themselves statements that implicate the 
confrontation right. 
FRE 1006’s location within the Federal Rules of Evidence deceptively 
suggests it is no more than one of a handful of exceptions to the “Best 
Evidence Rule,” FRE 1002.129  The Best Evidence Rule codifies the 
 
limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored”).  But see Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 
307, 324 n.9 (1985) (“Absent . . . extraordinary situations . . . we adhere to the crucial 
assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury that jurors carefully follow 
instructions.”); Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979) (dictum) (“A crucial assumption 
underlying [the jury system] is that juries will follow the instructions given to them by the 
trial judge.”). 
Concerns about the limitations of jury instructions often relate to the admission of 
prior acts evidence used for the limited purpose of attacking a defendant’s credibility as 
opposed to proving propensity.  See Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the 
Federal Courts Opened the Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior 
Convictions, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 300 (2008).  While the consequences of the jury 
drawing an improper inference in those cases are arguably greater than the jury drawing an 
improper inference from a demonstrative aid, the subtle nature of the difference between 
demonstrative aids and FRE 1006 summaries may make it more difficult for a jury to 
distinguish between the proper and improper use. 
128 See, e.g., Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2682 (2008) (addressing the application 
of the Confrontation Clause to statements admitted under a “provision of California law that 
permits admission of out-of-court statements describing the infliction or threat of physical 
injury on a declarant when the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial and the prior 
statements are deemed trustworthy); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006) 
(finding the admission of statements under the present sense impression exception a 
violation of the defendant’s confrontation right where the defendant did not have an 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness who made the statements). 
129 Rules 1001 through 1008 are codified in Article X of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
titled “Contents of Writings, Recordings, and Photographs.”  FRE 1002 is titled 
“Requirements of the Original” and states that “[a]n original writing, recording, or 
photograph is required in order to prove its contents unless these rules or a federal statute 
provide otherwise.”  FED. R. EVID. 1002.  With the exception of FRE 1008, which concerns 
the “Functions of the Court and Jury,” the remaining rules provide for exceptions to FRE 
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principle that “[w]hen a writing, recording, or photograph is offered to 
prove its content, the chances are good that the original will be more 
trustworthy than a copy.”130 
Despite this codification, the rule acts in many ways as a hearsay 
exception.  Both FRE 1006 summaries and the underlying documents are 
prepared out of court.  They are also intended to be received as substantive 
evidence asserting the truth of the matters contained within them.
131
  If it 
were not for FRE 1006, these summaries would be hearsay under FRE 
801(c) and FRE 802,
132
 and their admissibility would depend on whether 
there was an applicable exception.  The reason summary exhibits do not 
demand a separate hearsay exception is because FRE 1006 already requires 
that all underlying data be proven admissible.  Therefore, while the 
summary may be received as substantive evidence, it does not enable the 
“backdoor” admission of any new and otherwise inadmissible evidence.133  
Rather, summaries simply allow for the convenient presentation of 
information that has already been deemed admissible.  The hearsay 
exceptions set forth in FRE 803 and FRE 804,
134
 on the other hand, allow 
for the admission of evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible but for 
the exception.  For example, but for the public records exception under FRE 
803(8),
135
 triers of fact would not be able to view records and data 
 
1002’s requirement of originals.  This placement makes it easy to overlook the significance 
of FRE 1006 in other contexts. 
130 RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND CASES 198 (4th ed. 2006). 
131 Again, this is in contrast to pedagogical summaries admitted as demonstrative aids 
under FRE 611(a). 
132 FED. R. EVID. 801(c), 802.  Rule 801(c) defines hearsay as “a statement that (1) the 
declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers 
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”  Rule 802 states that 
“[h]earsay evidence is not admissible” unless a federal statute, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, or the Supreme Court indicate otherwise. 
133 In evidence law, the term “backdoor” refers to the tactic of admitting a particular 
piece of evidence under the pretense that it is being offered for an admissible purpose when 
it is in fact being offered for a purpose prohibited by the rules of evidence.  See, e.g., Martin 
A. Schwartz, Trial Evidence 2012: Advocacy Analysis, Illustrations, 881 PLI/LIT 19, 271 
(2012) (“The proponent of a Rule 1006 chart must lay a foundation showing . . . the 
underlying voluminous documents are admissible, e.g., under the business records rule; in 
other words, Rule 1006 is not a backdoor way of getting inadmissible evidence before the 
jury.”). 
134 FED. R. EVID. 803, 804.  FRE 803 lists “exceptions to the rule against hearsay—
regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness.”  FRE 804 provides for 
exceptions “when the declarant is unavailable as a witness.” 
135 FED. R. EVID. 803(8).  The rule allows for the admission of: 
A record or statement of a public office if: (A) it sets out: (i) the office’s activities; (ii) a matter 
observed while under a legal duty to report, but not including, in a criminal case, a matter 
observed by law-enforcement personnel; or (iii) in a civil case or against the government in a 
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compilations of public agencies.  The case is different for summaries.  Even 
if the government chooses not to use the summary, every piece of 
information reflected in the summary may still make it to the trier of fact if 
it is otherwise admissible.
136
 
A question the Court has yet to address is whether this difference 
protects defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.  After 
Crawford and Melendez-Diaz, prosecutors may no longer rely on “firmly-
rooted hearsay exception[s]” or “particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness” to offer testimonial evidence against a criminal defendant 
without affording him the opportunity for cross-examination.
137
  If a 
summary exhibit is the product of testimonial statements, it may be time to 
consider whether it should be admitted under FRE 1006 without 
confrontation.  Crawford’s focus on separating hearsay from the 
Confrontation Clause does not preclude the possibility that other types of 
evidence, such as testimonial summary exhibits, could implicate 
confrontation concerns when the defendant is afforded no opportunity to 
cross-examine the preparer of the summary. 
B. WHEN A SUMMARY IS MORE THAN JUST A SUMMARY 
When received as substantive evidence, a summary is more than just a 
mere recapitulation of voluminous information.  Depending on how the 
summary is presented, it is also a statement in and of itself.  A summary 
exhibit reflects not only a set of underlying data, but also the subjective 
determinations of the preparer, her procedures for distilling the voluminous 
information, and her decision of how the data should be presented.  
Moreover, because juries rarely see the voluminous underlying data itself 
(which need not be entered into evidence), the summary is often the only 
evidence the trier of fact will see on the point at issue.
138
 
The procedures of a forensic accounting team conducting a fraud 
investigation illustrate how a summary exhibit might raise Confrontation 
Clause concerns.  Certified fraud examiners, accountants, and auditors are 
often called upon to testify in criminal prosecutions where their testimony 
can be used to support charges such as fraud, embezzlement, misapplication 
 
criminal case, factual findings from a legally authorized investigation; and (B) neither the source 
of the information nor other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness. 
136 Peat, Inc. v. Vanguard Research, Inc., 378 F.3d 1154, 1160 (11th Cir. 2004). 
137 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42, 68–69 (2003). 
138 See Lockhart, supra note 118, § 3 (listing several cases where courts held either that it 
was not necessary to have the underlying materials admitted into evidence or that it was not 
error to admit summaries without admitting underlying materials). 
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of funds, or improper accounting practices.
139
  Lawyers often rely on these 
financial experts to “help crystallize the judge and/or jury’s 
comprehension” of complex cases.140  Fraud examiners analyze large 
amounts of data, conduct interviews, and ultimately produce reports 
detailing the findings of their investigations.
141
  Forensic accountants pore 
through thousands of documents and electronic files during the course of an 
investigation.
142
  Often, each individual document requires the forensic 
accountant to make a determination of whether the document is relevant or 
irrelevant, and whether it should be flagged for any particular reason.
143
  
The accountant might record his or her findings using either a database or a 
“key document” file, which keeps track of the documents determined by the 
investigator to be the most relevant.
144
 
The criteria used to determine whether a document should be flagged 
vary with each investigation.  In some instances, the forensic accountant’s 
determinations are objective and similar to those of an auditor.  Examples 
include marking whether an invoice is signed, whether the dollar amounts 
total correctly, or whether a transaction was approved before a particular 
date.  In other instances, however, a fraud examiner may be searching for 
attributes that require more judgment, such as whether a document appears 
forged, fabricated, or manipulated, or whether signatures appear to 
match.
145
  Although not expected to be documents experts, fraud examiners 
are also required to make subjective determinations that involve comparing 
papers and inks, determining whether two sheets of paper came from the 
same tablet or pad of paper, comparing torn or cut paper edges, identifying 
whether two photocopies came from the same copy machine, determining 




To the extent that subjective determinations are required to distill large 
amounts of information into a summary exhibit, the summary exhibit is 
more than just a mere reduction of voluminous data.  It becomes an exhibit 
 
139 ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS, FRAUD EXAMINERS MANUAL § 2.701 (2010) 
[hereinafter FRAUD EXAMINERS MANUAL]. 
140 Id. § 2.701. 
141 Id. § 2.704 (discussing the preparation of the expert report); id. § 3.101 (discussing 
document examination); id. § 3.201 (discussing interviews related to a fraud investigation). 
142 Id. § 3.101. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. § 3.103.  Fraud examiners will often utilize spreadsheet software to organize their 
efforts.  While the organizational method will vary with each investigation, a classic 
example of a tracking file would be a spreadsheet where each row lists a “relevant” 
document and each column reflects a specific attribute of that document. 
145 Id. §§ 3.104–.105. 
146 Id. §§ 3.105–.106. 
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that embodies dozens, if not hundreds, of subjective appraisals of 
documents offered as evidence against the accused. 
Moreover, the relevance of documents cannot be easily ascertained 
early in an investigation.
147
  For this reason, the Fraud Examiners Manual 
recommends that “all possible relevant documents be obtained.”148  The 
decision of which specific criteria should be tested in the first place is 
subjective and made early in the investigation by the forensic accounting 
team, often with the help of documents experts.
149
  The substance and 
presentation of the summary exhibit produced and used at trial would 
undoubtedly be affected by the accountant’s initial determinations regarding 
what is and is not relevant. 
By not allowing a defendant to cross-examine the individuals who 
determined which criteria would be tested and how it would be tested, the 
defendant is deprived of a crucial opportunity to probe and dissect the 
weaknesses of summary exhibits offered against him under FRE 1006.  In 
fact, the Fraud Examiners Manual acknowledges that “documents can 
either help or hurt a case, depending on which ones are presented and how 
they are presented.”150 
The subjectivity involved in creating a summary exhibit does not end 
there.  While documents are being analyzed, or immediately thereafter, 
fraud examiners use software to employ a variety of techniques in order to 
illuminate suspicious patterns and anomalies.
151
  These techniques include 
sorting, filtering, duplicate searches, and vertical and horizontal ratio 
analysis, among others.
152
  Again, the specific manner by which this process 
takes place could be based on a combination of individual experience, 
standard protocol, or specific information gleaned in that particular 
investigation.  Then, once the data has been sorted and the accountant has 
extracted information he deems pertinent to the investigation, a more senior 
forensic accountant might collaborate with the rest of the team to prepare a 
report of the findings of the investigation.  This report will also describe the 





147 Id. §§ 3.101, 3.103. 
148 Id. § 3.101. 
149 Id. § 3.105. 
150 Id. (emphasis added). 
151 Id. § 3.601. 
152 Id. 
153 The Fraud Examiners Manual neither mandates nor suggests a specific manner of 
dividing responsibility among the members of a forensic accounting team.  There is no rule 
requiring senior-level accountants to contribute to the preparation of the report, nor is there a 
rule prohibiting staff accountants from preparing reports.  The specific division of labor will 
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If the forensic accountant’s findings are used in a trial, the jury may be 
presented with only a summary exhibit that provides a snapshot of the 
findings.  The summary exhibit could come in various forms, including 
graphs, charts, tables with figures, or any other format the proponent of the 
summary exhibit deems effective in illustrating investigation findings to the 
jury and that the court does not find unfairly prejudicial.
154
 
This process of synthesizing raw documents and data into a summary 
exhibit involves subjective decisionmaking at almost every step.
155
  When 
reviewing documents, the decision of which attributes should be tested is a 
subjective one, or at the very least involves subjective elements.  The 
determinations of whether a particular signature is fraudulent, whether an 
expense is reasonable, or whether the ink on two separate documents is 
identical requires a judgment call.  In the analysis phase, the determination 
of how the prevalence of each “flag” should be analyzed across the entire 
population of documents is also subjective.  Finally, the accountant’s 
decision of how to present the data most effectively in the form of a 
summary exhibit is subjective.
156
 
The multiple layers of discretionary decisionmaking that separate the 
underlying information from the summary exhibit are what make a 
summary exhibit more than just a “summary.”  Rather, a summary exhibit 
created through processes analogous to the one described above should be 
viewed as a collection of separate, independent statements.  Every time the 
forensic accountant makes a subjective determination as to the meaning or 
implication of a particular document, the accountant is in essence making 
an out-of-court statement against the defendant, which then appears or is 
reflected in a summary exhibit.  When offered against a defendant as 
substantive evidence under FRE 1006 in a criminal prosecution, the 
Confrontation Clause demands that the defendant have the opportunity to 
cross-examine the maker of that statement. 
Courts have expressed concern about the admission of summary 
exhibits, suggesting that summaries are more than just restatements that 
highlight certain information.
157
  One concern is that summary exhibits give 
 
likely be driven by practical considerations, such the team’s level of experience, areas of 
competency, and staffing constraints. 
154 See Lockhart, supra note 118, § 4(a) (listing cases where courts have admitted 
summary exhibits taking a variety of forms, including graphs, charts, and tables); FRAUD 
EXAMINERS MANUAL, supra note 139, §§ 27, 29–30 (discussing cases where courts have 
refused to admit summary exhibits on the basis that they would be unfairly prejudicial under 
FRE 403). 
155 FRAUD EXAMINERS MANUAL, supra note 139, §§ 3.104–.106. 
156 Id. § 3.101. 
157 See, e.g., United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating that 
there are “obvious dangers” posed by summary exhibits, including the possibility that the 
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the prosecution the opportunity to make two closing arguments.
158
  The fear 
is that jurors will perceive the proponent’s arguments as more convincing 
because they will have one side of the case summarized for them twice—
once from the witness who presents the summary and again during closing 
arguments and rebuttal.
159
  Another danger is that jurors will simply be 
unduly grateful to one party for presenting them with a coherent and 
succinct summary of the evidence in a complex case.
160
  Admittedly, these 
issues are addressed by a different rule, FRE 403, which allows judges to 
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury.
161
  Nevertheless, these concerns suggest that courts consider summary 
exhibits separate statements, not just recapitulative learning tools for the 
jury. 
While not discussed in the context of the Confrontation Clause, 
Mueller and Kirkpatrick’s treatise on federal evidence law addresses the 
concern that summaries “may include conclusions or interpretations 
suggested by competent witnesses that in effect sum up the entries in the 
summary itself.”162  The treatise acknowledges that “[t]o some extent . . . 
summary evidence necessarily involves selecting some things and leaving 
out others, and necessarily it involves interpreting and drawing conclusions, 
for these processes are inherent in the task of condensing a mass of material 
into a form that is shorter and more readily understandable.”163  Because 
 
jury will “treat the summary as additional evidence or as corroborative of the truth of the 
underlying testimony”); United States v. Means, 695 F.2d 811, 817 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(recognizing “the powerful impression which charts can make upon a jury, vesting the charts 
with ‘an air of credibility’ independent of the evidence purported to be summarized” (citing 
Steele v. United States, 222 F.2d 628, 630 (5th Cir. 1955))).  
158 Pamela H. Bucy, The Poor Fit of Traditional Evidentiary Doctrine and Sophisticated 
Crime: An Empirical Analysis of Health Care Fraud Prosecutions, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 
383, 420 (1995) (“[A]uthentication of summaries may allow their proponent the equivalent 
of an additional closing argument through the summary.”); Lauren Weiser, Note, 
Requirements for Admitting Summary Testimony of Government Agents in Federal White 
Collar Cases, 36 AM. J. CRIM. L. 179, 181 (2008); see also United States v. Fullwood, 342 
F.3d 409, 414 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[S]ummary witnesses are not to be used as a substitute for, 
or a supplement to, closing argument.”). 
159 Means, 695 F.2d at 817 (“[W]e recognize the powerful impression which charts can 
make upon a jury, vesting the charts with ‘an air of credibility’ independent of the evidence 
purported to be summarized.” (quoting Steele, 222 F.2d at 630)). 
160 Bucy, supra note 158, at 420–21. 
161 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
162 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 5 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 10:34, at 
836 (3d ed. 2007). 
163 Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 816 (11th Cir. 1984) (admitting a 
forty-page chart consisting of fifteen columns in a Medicare fraud trial where the charts were 
“derived either from other exhibits received into evidence or from oral testimony,” and the 
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conclusions drawn from the underlying voluminous information “are one 
step further removed from otherwise admissible evidence, and while 
summary proof necessarily entails hearsay risks (summaries restate, even as 
they condense, although this hearsay point is usually overlooked), 
interpretive conclusions seem to increase the hearsay risks (the conclusions 
are a restater’s restatement of his own restatement).”164  This overlooking of 
the hearsay issue when admitting a summary exhibit that not only 
condenses but also restates the underlying evidence in the form of an 
interpretive conclusion is flatly inconsistent with Crawford.  Under 
Crawford, a defendant should have the opportunity to cross-examine the 
witnesses against him, regardless of whether the statements fall within an 
evidentiary rule that otherwise allows for their admission.
165
 
C. SUMMARIES ARE TESTIMONIAL 
For a summary to implicate the Confrontation Clause, it must also be 
testimonial.
166
  That is, it must be a summary that satisfies the primary 
purpose test articulated in Davis and reaffirmed in Bullcoming.
167
  The 
definition and scope of what is testimonial currently rests on Justice 
Clarence Thomas’s construction of the term.168  Justice Thomas’s 
concurring opinion in Melendez-Diaz construes the term more narrowly 
than the rest of the Melendez-Diaz majority.  According to Justice Thomas, 
“the Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements only 
insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as 
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.”169  With Justice 
Thomas carrying the deciding vote in Melendez-Diaz, this narrower 
definition of testimonial controls.  The difference between Justice Thomas’s 
 
last two columns reflected conclusions by a Health and Human Services Special Agent, who 
was qualified as an expert). 
164 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 162, § 10:34, at 836 (emphasis added). 
165 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
166 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006). 
167 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2714, n.6 (2011); Davis, 547 U.S. at 
822. 
168 It should be noted that to the extent that there have been changes on the Supreme 
Court since Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009), was decided, those 
changes do not weigh in favor of broadening the scope of the opinion.  The four dissenting 
Justices with the narrowest construction of the Confrontation Clause (Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito) remain on the Court.  Justice Thomas, who sided 
with the majority but wrote a concurring opinion limiting its scope, also remains on the 
Court. 
169 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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construction and the rest of the majority’s is the addition of the word 
“formalized.”170 
While the examples Justice Thomas lists—affidavits, depositions, 
prior testimony, and confessions—suggest that most formalized testimonial 
materials must be sworn or provided under oath, Bullcoming makes it clear 
that this is not the case.  Under Bullcoming, the fact that assertions are 
unsworn does not remove them from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment.
171
  
The State, attempting to distinguish Bullcoming’s case from Melendez-
Diaz, pointed to the fact that the lab analyst’s findings in that case were 
sworn before a notary public while Caylor’s report was unsworn.172  The 
Court agreed with the New Mexico Supreme Court on this point, stating 
“the absence of an oath is not dispositive in determining if a statement is 
testimonial.”173  Justice Sotomayor elaborated that though unsworn, “[t]he 
formality [of the BAC report] derive[d] from the fact that the analyst [was] 
asked to sign his name and ‘certify’ to both the result and the statements on 
the form.”174 
Bullcoming also reinforces the primary purpose test articulated in 
Davis v. Washington.
175
  Whether an assertion is testimonial does not hinge 
on the status of the person who makes it but rather on its “evidentiary 
purpose.”176  In Bullcoming, the State maintained that the unavailable 
witness’s affirmations were non-testimonial because they were neither 
“adversarial” nor “inquisitorial,” but rather “simply observations of an 
‘independent scientist’ made according to a non-adversarial public duty.”177  
The proponent of a testimonial summary exhibit could make a similar 
argument—that the individuals who made the assertions reflected in the 
summary are, in the forensic accounting context for example, “independent 
investigators” and not accusatory witnesses against the defendant.  
Bullcoming suggests that such an argument would be unavailing.  
Reaffirming its adherence to the primary purpose test, the Court held that 
“[a] document created solely for an evidentiary purpose . . . , made in aid of 
 
170 Fenner, supra note 13, at 39. 
171 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Though this may appear to be an expansion of 
the holding in Melendez-Diaz, the Court did not see this as breaking new ground, stating that 
“[i]ndeed, in Crawford, this Court rejected as untenable any construction of the 
Confrontation Clause that would render inadmissible only sworn ex parte affidavits, while 
leaving admission of formal, but unsworn statements perfectly okay.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
174 Id. at 2721 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
175 Id. at 2714, n.6 (majority opinion). 
176 Id. at 2717. 
177 Id. 
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a police investigation, ranks as testimonial.”178  It would be difficult for the 
proponent of a testimonial summary to find a meaningful distinction 
between an investigation led by the police with the aid of a crime lab and a 
criminal investigation led by the SEC with the aid of a forensic accounting 
team.  In neither case, under Bullcoming, would the proponent of a 
summary be able to rely on the witness’s independent status to avoid the 
Sixth Amendment mandate. 
Justice Sotomayor wrote a separate concurrence to detail how the 
primary purpose test applied to Bullcoming’s case.179  Some of the language 
from this concurrence might help illuminate how the test could apply to 
summary exhibits. 
According to Justice Sotomayor, a statement is testimonial if “it has ‘a 
primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial 
testimony.’”180  Absent confrontation, such statements are inadmissible, 
notwithstanding the fact that they may fall within a hearsay exception.
181
  
Therefore courts should look to whether a summary exhibit was derived 
from assertions intended to be used as evidence in a criminal prosecution 
when determining whether the Confrontation Clause applies.  In the 
forensic accounting context, if the primary purpose of an investigation is 
not to produce evidence for criminal prosecution, confrontation would not 
be required.  Justice Sotomayor specifically noted that Bullcoming did not 
present a case where “the State suggested an alternate purpose, much less 
an alternate primary purpose, for the BAC report.”182  This notation 
suggests that assertions made during an internal fraud investigation would 
not be testimonial, even if those same assertions were eventually used by 
the government to create a summary exhibit in a criminal prosecution.
183
 
Otherwise, if a summary exhibit is being offered, if it was prepared in 
anticipation of litigation, and if the statements contain the results of 
subjective determinations of what is important and how it should be 
 
178 Id. at 2717. 
179 Id. at 2719 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
180 Id. at 2720 (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011)). 
181 Id. (stating that because the purpose of the certificates in Melendez-Diaz was use at 
trial, they were not properly admissible as business or public records under the hearsay 
rules). 
182 Id. at 2721. 
183 In this hypothetical, the summary exhibit itself should still be testimonial under the 
primary purpose test.  While the assertions reflected in the summary may not have been 
made with an eye toward litigation, the same could not be said about the summary exhibit 
derived from them.  However if the summary exhibit is testimonial evidence but the 
underlying assertions are not, the only individual who would need to be confronted would be 
the preparer of the summary.  As mentioned earlier, the testifying expert and preparer of the 
summary are often the same person. 
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presented, then the Confrontation Clause demands that the defendant be 
given the opportunity to cross-examine the preparer of the summary. 
D. “THE ONLY INDICIUM OF RELIABILITY . . . THE CONSTITUTION 
ACTUALLY PRESCRIBES . . . .”184 
In a pre-Crawford era, one could justify “overlooking” the hearsay 
problem inherent in summaries that are a step (or in the case of our forensic 
accountant, several steps) removed from the underlying voluminous 
information.  The information contained within the summary, whether 
objective or conclusory, must be based on information that is admissible.  
Under Roberts, this meant the information underlying the summary would 
have to fall within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception or bear particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness.”185  So long as this was the case, admitting a 




Furthermore, FRE 1006 requires that the underlying voluminous 
information be provided to opposing counsel within a reasonable time 
period.
187
  This requirement gives defendants an opportunity to dissect the 
raw information, identify instances of poor judgment or partisan zeal, cross-
examine the expert, and perhaps even prepare a separate summary exhibit to 
counter the prosecution’s summary.  However, the question remains: Will 
defendants have been adequately afforded the right to confront their 
accusers if given access to the underlying data, or does the Confrontation 
Clause mandate an opportunity to cross-examine those who made the 
statements reflected in the summary? 
While the protections built into FRE 1006 undoubtedly place 
defendants in a better position than they would be otherwise, they are 
simply not sufficient in a post-Crawford world.  If a statement is being 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, the proponent of that statement 
can no longer, under Crawford, claim that the confrontation right has been 
satisfied because it is reliable or admissible under the rules of evidence.
188
  
Crawford made very clear that “the only indicium of reliability sufficient to 
 
184 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004). 
185 Id. at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining the rule established in Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)). 
186 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
187 Square Liner 360, Inc. v. Chisum, 691 F.2d 362, 376 (8th Cir. 1982); White Indus., 
Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 611 F. Supp. 1049, n.10. (W.D. Mo. 1985) (“Ordinarily that 
‘reasonable time’ will be at some point before trial, since the object is to give opposing 
counsel a meaningful opportunity to prepare challenges to the materials; although it would 
be within the trial court’s discretion to permit the matter to be dealt with during trial.”). 
188 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (“Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is 
fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation.”). 
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satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually 
prescribes: confrontation.”189  Summaries already carry the inherent risk 
that “important details may be overlooked because they are buried or 
perhaps hidden by accident or partisan zeal.”190  There is also the risk that 
“inadmissible evidence will creep in unnoticed, or that suggested 
conclusions will be accepted uncritically because the mass of underlying 
data are complex, and perhaps technical and forbidding.”191  To overlook 
the hearsay problem inherent in summary exhibits, the contents of which 
are layers of discretion removed from the underlying information, and 
therefore are separate statements themselves, would deprive defendants of 
the procedural right to highlight “partisan zeal” on the part of the 
government or probe the credibility of subjective determinations reflected 
in the summary through cross-examination. 
The availability of underlying documents fails to satisfy the 
confrontation right for one simple reason.  As Justice Scalia stated in 
Crawford, the only way to satisfy the constitutional right to confrontation is 
confrontation.
192
  Other provisions of FRE 1006, such as the right to request 
underlying documents,
193
 may help remedy the detriment to the defendant 
of being unable to cross-examine the preparer of the summary, but it is not 
the procedural provision the Constitution and Crawford’s progeny mandate.  
Allowing for the admission of a summary exhibit without confrontation of 
the individuals who analyzed the data reflected in the summaries would be 
going back to the reasoning of Roberts that was explicitly rejected in 
Crawford.  Rule 1006’s compensating protections notwithstanding, 
Crawford and its progeny demand the opportunity for cross-examination. 
Confrontation in the summary exhibit context is especially important 
because not all criminal defendants have the legal resources to take full 
advantage of the protections afforded in FRE 1006.  A defendant with 
limited resources at his disposal will likely be unable to sort through the 
underlying voluminous records, analyze them in depth, retain an expert, and 
produce a summary or set of summary exhibits to counter the prosecution’s 
summary exhibit.  Confrontation in the form of cross-examination remains 
the only fair, relatively resource-neutral, and constitutionally mandated 
method of appraisal. 
Another danger of admitting summaries without providing the right to 
confrontation is that the information underlying the summary may be based 
 
189 Id. at 69. 
190 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 162, § 10:34. 
191 Id. 
192 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69. 
193 FED. R. EVID. 1006 (“The proponent must make the originals or duplicates available 
for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and place.”). 
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on out-of-court statements made during the course of interviews or other 
investigative activities.
194
  The preparer’s perspective and decisionmaking 
may be affected by his preexisting biases regarding particular transactions, 
people, and entities involved in the investigation.  In United States v. 
Lemire, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged the “obvious dangers” in 
summarizing evidence and the danger of “subtle introduction of otherwise 
inadmissible evidence” because witnesses relied on out-of-court statements 
to understand some transactions.
195
  The court stated in dicta that a 
“summary should not draw controversial inferences.”196  The summary in 
that case was held admissible because it “involved only routine 
computations and culling through of documents to eliminate confusing and 
extraneous evidence.”197 
The problem is that summaries often contain more than just routine 
computations of mathematical data.
198
  Returning to our forensic accounting 
investigation example, not only does the summary contain several layers of 
subjective interpretation, but this interpretation is usually based at least in 
part on information gleaned from interviews.  Depending on how broadly 
the term testimonial is to be construed, it could be argued that the 
statements from these interviews, if intended to be used in criminal 
proceedings and later embodied in the summary exhibit, may be open to 
confrontation as well.
199
  According to Mueller and Kirkpatrick, “if the 
author of interpretive conclusions prepared the summary entries themselves, 
and if the author testifies in court and is available for cross-examination, the 
added risks should not be enough to warrant exclusion.”200  But what 
happens when the author or preparer of the summary does not testify in 
court?  What if the witness sponsoring the summary exhibit only 
supervised, or worse, only reviewed the process that led to the creation of 
the summary exhibit?  While this may be enough to satisfy the foundation 
for the exhibit for evidentiary purposes under FRE 703, it hardly seems 
sufficient to satisfy the defendant’s right to confrontation for constitutional 
purposes.  The two may have been one and the same under Roberts, but 
 
194 FRAUD EXAMINERS MANUAL, supra note 139, § 3.201. 
195 720 F.2d 1327, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
196 Id. at 1350. 
197 Id. 
198 Lockhart, supra note 118, § 28 (discussing the dangers of argumentative or 
conclusory summaries). 
199 This view does not currently command the majority of the Court, but barely perhaps.  
Justices Sotomayor’s and Thomas’s concurrences in Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz, 
respectively, advocate for a higher bar for a statement to be considered testimonial.  Justices 
Ginsburg, Kagan, and Scalia have not written separately to express how broadly the term 
testimonial should be construed. 
200 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 162, § 10:34. 
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they are not under Crawford.  Under Crawford, confrontation is a 
procedural right that can only be satisfied if the reliability of the statement 
is tested “in the crucible of cross-examination.”201 
Not all summary exhibits under FRE 1006 are in conflict with the 
Confrontation Clause.  Not all summaries are the products of the heavy 
distillation process described in the above forensic accountant example.  In 
some cases, the summary exhibit may contain nothing more than a simple 
set of arithmetic totals or averages from the underlying data.
202
  In another 
hypothetical situation, a summary may be nothing more than a list of 
transactions from multiple documents.  The fewer discretionary judgment 
calls required to go from the voluminous data to the summary exhibit, the 
more objective the resulting summary exhibit.  If a summary is truly a 
simple aggregation of data or information, criminal defendants should find 
it difficult to argue the summary exhibit is a separate statement.  
Therefore, the adoption of this Comment’s position would not result in 
Confrontation Clause violations for all testimonial summary exhibits.  In 
order to determine whether the admission of an FRE 1006 summary runs 
afoul of the Sixth Amendment, a court should first determine whether the 
summary is a purely objective aggregation of the underlying information or 
whether it reflects the proponent’s subjective understanding and 
conclusions about that information.  If the former is true, the summary 
should not be considered a statement separate from the underlying data.  In 
such cases, cross-examination of the sponsoring witness would sufficiently 
allow the defendant to confront the testimony against him.  Because the 
sponsoring witness is usually the same person who supervised the analysis 
of the underlying information and the preparation of the summary, a 
summary that is nothing more than an objective reduction of the 
voluminous information that underlies it should not raise confrontation 
concerns so long as the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine a 
witness who has knowledge of how the summary was created.  The logic of 
this position lies in the fact that there are no new “statements” or 
“determinations” embodied in a purely objective summary that only 
repackages admissible evidence.  In deriving such a summary from the 
underlying data, the only new contributions may be, for example, an 
application of agreed-upon mathematical principles.  Choosing to display 





201 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
202 See, e.g., United States v. Jennings, 724 F.2d 436, 443 (5th Cir. 1984) (admitting a 
summary exhibit containing simple calculations). 
203 See, e.g., United States v. Bentley, 825 F.2d 1104, 1108–09 (7th Cir. 1987) (admitting 
charts in a mail fraud trial showing the company’s net position in silver and copper futures 
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In our forensic accountant example, the partner who oversaw the 
investigation would usually testify as an expert witness.
204
  While 
Melendez-Diaz did not involve a summary exhibit or forensic accountants, 
the relationship between the testimonial exhibit and the underlying evidence 
was similar.  The evidence at issue in Melendez-Diaz was a white powder 
suspected to be cocaine.
205
  The testimonial exhibits in question were 
certificates of state laboratory analysts stating that the substance was 
cocaine.
206
  Similar to our forensic accountant example, the Court held that 
the methodology used in generating the reports “require[d] the exercise of 
judgment and present[ed] a risk of error that might be explored on cross-
examination.”207  The degree of subjective decisionmaking required of a 
forensic accountant when analyzing a voluminous amount of underlying 
information and then using that information to create a summary exhibit is 
arguably much greater than the degree of judgment required of a lab analyst 
when using technical devices to determine whether a particular substance is 
in fact cocaine.  This is why allowing for cross-examination of the preparer 
of the summary is crucial. 
E. EXPERT TESTIMONY AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
If several subjective determinations were necessary to create a 
summary and those determinations are reflected in that summary, the right 
to confrontation cannot be satisfied by simply allowing the defendant to 
cross-examine the sponsoring witness.  Under Crawford, the Court should 
hold that the defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him is not 
satisfied unless the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the 
witnesses who actually made those determinations.  Though an expert who 
supervised the preparation of a summary exhibit may be able to lay the 
appropriate foundation to introduce the summary into evidence, it does not 
necessarily follow that a cross-examination of that expert will allow the 
defendant to probe the reliability and accuracy of that summary, or the 
credibility of the assertions contained therein. 
Furthermore, appellate courts rarely find reversible error for admitting 
a summary exhibit under FRE 1006, even where a lower court’s admission 
prompts the appellate court to give a strongly worded warning regarding 
 
every twenty days, and rejecting the claim that the charts were improper because they did not 
show other days because “charts need not be encyclopedic,” defendants could show that the 
company was properly hedged at other times, and the data sample on the chart was deemed 
large enough to be statistically valid). 
204 FRAUD EXAMINERS MANUAL, supra note 139, § 2.701. 
205 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2529 (2009). 
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 2537. 
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unfair prejudice.
208
  For this reason, cross-examination may be the 
defendant’s only recourse to help mitigate the damage caused by a 
prejudicial summary exhibit.
209
  Through cross-examination, the defendant 
may address the accuracy of the summaries, methods used to prepare 
summaries, underlying factual assumptions, and patterns of selectivity that 
may reflect bias.
210
  If the summary is to be considered an independent 
statement (as it should be), the defendant must be given the opportunity to 
cross-examine the person who actually made the assertions reflected in the 
summary. 
Testimonial assertions reflected in a summary exhibit may yet avoid 
constitutional scrutiny.  This is because under FRE 703, an expert witness 
may testify to extrinsic facts and data in order to aid the trier of fact in 
understanding the expert’s testimony.211  The testifying expert does not 
have to be the same expert who performed the analysis.  She also does not 
have to be the individual who prepared the report, so long as the expert has 
formed a relevant and independent conclusion based on underlying facts 
and data that are reasonably relied upon by experts in that field.
212
  This 
allows one expert to testify to the work of several individuals, and reflects a 
compromise between preventing experts from becoming conduits of 
inadmissible evidence and allowing the jury to hear testimony that would 
facilitate a better understanding of the testimony.
213
  For exhibits that 
summarize complex and voluminous information, this means that there is 
an evidentiary basis for allowing a forensic accounting expert to testify to 
the work of her subordinates.  What the court would have to determine, 
 
208 See, e.g., United States v. Fullwood, 342 F.3d 409, 413–14 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(cautioning strongly against the use of summary witnesses as a “substitute for, or supplement 
to, closing argument,” but still finding no reversible error despite the fact that the summary 
witness was used in this fashion). 
209 Weiser, supra note 158, at 203. 
210 See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374, 1412 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The defense 
had full opportunity to cross-examine [the testifying government agent] about her methods 
of preparing the summaries, her alleged selectivity, and her partiality.”). 
211 FED. R. EVID. 703.  Federal Rule of Evidence 703 allows “facts or data otherwise 
inadmissible” to be presented to the jury if “their probative value in helping the jury  
evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.”  Id. 
212 See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 537 F.3d 951, 959–60 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that an expert forensic scientist may testify, without violating the defendant’s right to 
confrontation, about DNA evidence linking the defendant to a firearm even though the 
expert did not perform any tests of her own and did not personally receive the evidence, but 
instead relied solely on her peer review of the lab technician’s report). 
213 Ian Volek, Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 703: The Back Door and the 
Confrontation Clause, Ten Years Later, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 959 (2011) (asserting that FRE 
703 may carry its own Confrontation Clause concerns because the rule could be used to 
mask confrontation violations). 
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however, is whether this evidentiary basis for admission should be 
separated, as it was in Crawford, from the constitutional basis for admission 
under the Sixth Amendment. 
The Melendez-Diaz Court recognized the importance of having the 
actual preparer of the testimonial evidence available for cross-examination, 
especially where the preparer has exercised his judgment in creating the 
exhibit.
214
  That case, however, did not decide whether the right to 
confrontation could be satisfied by giving the defendant an opportunity to 
cross-examine an expert witness who is familiar with the process through 
which an exhibit was created.  In many cases involving summary exhibits, 
the testimony of the witness who prepares a summary exhibit is 
indispensable as a practical matter.
215
  However, it is common for a witness 
who supervised the preparation of the summary to testify in lieu of the 
individual who actually prepared the exhibit.
216
  There is no explicit 




Bullcoming dealt with a lab report admitted under the business records 
exception.
218
  The Court did not address the issue of whether summary 
exhibits ought to be admissible without confrontation of the individuals 
who made the assertions reflected in the exhibit.  However, the Court’s 
reasoning does provide insight into how it would approach the question.  
First, Bullcoming suggests the Court would not allow summarized 
testimonial assertions to escape Sixth Amendment scrutiny simply because 
they are derived from a set of routine procedures.  The Court recognized the 
value of confrontation even where procedures are seemingly routine, noting 
that cross-examination would nevertheless enable a defendant to probe the 
testing process, expose lapses and lies, and highlight a witness’s potential 
bias or lack of experience.
219
 
This recognition also speaks to a second, more practical concern that 
applies in the summary exhibit context: witnesses who perform routine 
analyses are unlikely to be able to recount a particular test by the time they 
 
214 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2009) (“[A]n analyst’s lack 
of proper training or deficiency in judgment may be disclosed on cross-examination.”).  
215 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 162, § 10:34. 
216 See, e.g., United States v. Bray, 139 F.3d 1104, 1110 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that in 
order to lay a proper foundation for a summary to be admitted into evidence under FRE 
1006, the proponent should present the testimony of the witness who supervised its 
preparation). 
217 See, e.g., United States v. Bertoli, 854 F. Supp. 975, 1055 (D.N.J. 1994) (admitting 
summary exhibits authenticated by a person able to attest that they accurately summarized 
the underlying material rather than by someone who actually prepared the exhibits). 
218 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2011). 
219 Id. at 2715. 
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are called to testify, diminishing any benefit that could be derived from 
cross-examination.  Similarly, a forensic accountant who has pored through 
thousands of documents months or even years before trial may not 
remember specific details at a trial or deposition.  The Bullcoming Court 
recognized these challenges but stated that the defendant’s attorney could 
still have “raise[d] before a jury questions concerning [the analyst’s] 
proficiency, the care he took in performing his work, and his veracity.”220 
More fundamentally, the Court held that “the [Confrontation] Clause does 
not tolerate dispensing with confrontation simply because the court believes 
that questioning one witness about another’s testimonial statements 
provides a fair enough opportunity for cross-examination.”221 
Apparently recognizing the potential impact Bullcoming may have on 
the admissibility of expert testimony, Justice Sotomayor wrote separately to 
“emphasize the limited reach of the Court’s opinion” in this regard.222  First, 
she noted that Bullcoming was “not a case in which the person testifying is 
a supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited, 
connection to the scientific test at issue.”223  Justice Sotomayor found 
significant the fact that “Razatos conceded . . . that he played no role in 
producing the BAC report and did not observe any portion of Curtis 
Caylor’s conduct of the testing.”224  She went on to state that “[i]t would be 
a different case if, for example, a supervisor who observed an analyst 
conducting a test testified about the result or a report about such results.”225 
The concurrence gives a hint, but no details on exactly how the Court 
should analyze such a case.  Justice Sotomayor closes the discussion by 
stating “[w]e need not address what degree of involvement [by the expert] 
is sufficient because here Razatos had no involvement whatsoever in the 
relevant test and report.”226  Because Justice Sotomayor provided the fifth 
and final vote in the Bullcoming majority, the constitutionality of admitting 
a testimonial summary exhibit through an expert witness may turn on the 
expert’s “degree of involvement” with the analysis underlying the 
summary.  It remains to be seen what degree of involvement would be 
necessary for the expert’s testimony to avoid constitutional scrutiny. 
The forensic accounting hypothetical described above illustrates the 
importance of allowing criminal defendants to confront the individuals who 
actually make the assertions against them.  In a forensic accounting 
 
220 Id. at 2715 n.7. 
221 Id. at 2716. 
222 Id. at 2719 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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investigation, the partner managing the engagement would be most likely to 
testify in court should the case go to trial.
227
  While this partner may have 
planned the overall engagement strategy and is likely to know more about 
the investigation at a macro level than anyone else, it is usually the 
partner’s subordinates (staff accountants, senior staff accountants, 
managers, etc.) who make most of the document-specific judgment calls 
that eventually lead to the creation of a summary exhibit.  The following 
hypothetical illustrates how the various tasks associated with a fraud 
investigation may be divided among the members of a forensic accounting 
team: The staff-level accountant may be the one to determine whether a 
signature appears fraudulent, or whether the expense was “reasonable” or 
“necessary.”  A senior staff accountant or manager may conduct interviews 
with employees and later determine how the staff accountants’ results 
should be sorted, filtered, and presented.  The manager may then prepare a 
draft copy of a report summarizing the investigation.  The supervising 
partner then reviews the draft report and any potential summary charts or 
tables and communicates with the staff accountants and managers in order 
to gain an understanding of how they were put together.  This 
understanding would serve as the basis for the partner’s testimony if she 
were to be called to testify in court as an expert witness.
228
 
This process raises the question of whether the right to confrontation 
requires giving the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the person 
who actually made the decisions that led to the information contained 
within the summary, or whether it is sufficient that the defendant was 
allowed to cross-examine the partner who supervised the overall 
investigation.  The members of the forensic accounting team involved in the 
creation of a summary exhibit are clearly accusatory witnesses against the 
defendant under Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming.  To the extent that their 
subjective determinations throughout the investigation are reflected in a 
summary exhibit, they certainly “provide[] testimony against [the 
defendant], proving [facts] necessary for . . . conviction.”229  Melendez-Diaz 
made clear that “there is not a . . . category of witnesses, helpful to the 
prosecution, but somehow immune from confrontation.”230  It is also 
important to point out that this is not a chain-of-custody issue.  Melendez-
 
227 See FRAUD EXAMINERS MANUAL, supra note 139, §§ 2.701, 2.707. 
228 It is worth reiterating that this hypothetical division of responsibility is neither 
mandated or suggested in the Fraud Examiners Manual.  The hypothetical is intended to 
serve as an example of how multiple individuals play an integral role in developing the 
testimonial assertions reflected in a summary exhibit.  The exact division of labor may vary 
with each investigation. 
229 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2533 (2009). 
230 Id. at 2534. 
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Diaz made clear that it is not necessary for every individual who handled a 
piece of evidence to come to court to testify against a defendant.
231
  In the 
case of a summary exhibit, the danger is that different individuals made 
separate, often subjective determinations related to the investigation, and 
that these determinations are reflected in the summary exhibit admitted at 
trial without the defendant having the opportunity to cross-examine those 
individuals. 
Cases before Crawford and Melendez-Diaz suggested that it would be 
sufficient to have only the partner who managed the investigation testify to 
the summary exhibit.  In United States v. Behrens, the court admitted a 
summary exhibit over objections that the chart lacked foundation, holding 
that foundation can be laid through the testimony of a witness who 
supervised the preparation of the exhibit.
232
  Behrens, however, was decided 
long before Crawford (and, in fact, in the shadow of Roberts), and admitted 
the summary on the basis that there was a sufficient foundation for 
evidentiary purposes.
233
  Behrens did not decide whether there was any 
constitutional impediment to the admission of a summary exhibit when the 
defendant was not afforded the opportunity to cross-examine its preparer.
234
  
The holding in Behrens, therefore, while allowing for the admission of a 
summary through a witness other than the preparer of the summary, does 
not foreclose the exclusion of a similar summary today on Sixth 
Amendment grounds. 
Similarly, United States v. Moon, which was decided after Crawford 
but before Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, concerned a doctor who was 
charged with fraud arising from billing Medicaid and other insurance 
programs for full doses of chemotherapy while administering only partial 
doses.
235
  The prosecution introduced summary charts, which compared the 
drugs the defendant purchased with the amount she claimed to administer, 
and then estimated her resultant profits from the demonstrated 
discrepancy.
236
  The Sixth Circuit held that such charts were accurate, not 




Moon, like Behrens, held that there was adequate foundation for 
admission without addressing any constitutional issues related to 
 
231 Id. at 2532 n.1. 
232 689 F.2d 154, 161 (10th Cir. 1982). 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 532 (6th Cir. 2008). 
236 Id. at 545. 
237 Id. at 546. 
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confrontation.
238
  There are two reasons why Moon should not foreclose the 
existence of constitutional problems inherent in the use of this evidence, 
notwithstanding the fact that it was decided after Crawford.  First, no Sixth 
Amendment challenge was made in Moon.
239
  Second, Moon was decided 
before Melendez-Diaz, where the Court held that the “witnesses against 
him” phrase in the Sixth Amendment means all witnesses who provide 
testimony against the petitioner.
240
  When Moon was decided, “witnesses 
against” the accused was understood to mean traditional witnesses of the 
type Justice Kennedy discussed in the Melendez-Diaz dissent.
241
 
IV. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF WILLIAMS V. ILLINOIS 
In Williams v. Illinois,
242
 the Supreme Court addressed whether the 
Sixth Amendment bars the admission against a criminal defendant of 
assertions made by an out-of-court declarant that are offered through the 
testimony of an expert witness.  Because summary exhibits under FRE 
1006 are commonly offered through the testimony of an expert witness,
243
 
the Court’s decision in Williams will undoubtedly affect how summary 
exhibits derived from testimonial assertions will be treated under the Sixth 
Amendment.  However, because the Williams plurality reached its 
conclusion through a questionable and previously discredited analysis, it is 
unclear exactly how the decision will influence constitutional scrutiny of 
summary exhibits. 
In Williams, the defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated 
criminal sexual assault, one count of aggravated kidnapping, and one count 
of aggravated robbery.
244
  The victim, L.J., was taken to the emergency 
room where a physician treated her and took vaginal swabs.
245
  The vaginal 
swabs were sealed, placed in a criminal sexual assault kit, and sent to the 
Illinois State Police (ISP) crime lab for testing and analysis.
246
  A forensic 
biologist at the lab, Brian Hapack, received the kit and performed an acid 
phosphatase test that confirmed the presence of semen.
247
  Hapack testified 
 
238 Id. at 545–46; Behrens, 689 F.2d at 161. 
239 513 F.3d 527. 
240 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2533–34 (2009). 
241 Id. at 2551–52 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  According to Justice Kennedy, traditional 
witnesses are those witnesses who (1) recall events they actually observed in the past instead 
of making near-contemporaneous observations, (2) observe a crime or “any human action 
related to it,” or (3) provide statements in response to interrogation.  Id. 
242 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). 
243 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 162, § 10:34. 
244 People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268, 269 (Ill. 2010). 
245 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2229. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. 
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that after performing the test, he resealed the evidence and left it in a secure 
freezer at the ISP lab.
248
  Hapack “guaranteed the accuracy of his results by 
working in a clean environment free from contamination and by ensuring 
the tests functioned properly.”249  The ISP lab sent those samples to 
Cellmark Diagnostic Laboratory in Maryland for DNA analysis.
250
  
Cellmark derived a DNA profile of the person whose semen was recovered 
from the victim and sent the profile back to the ISP lab.
251
  At this point in 




An ISP forensic specialist, Sandra Lambatos, ran a computer search 
comparing the Cellmark profile against entries in the state DNA dabatase.
253
  
It matched a profile produced from a blood sample taken from the 
defendant after he was arrested for an unrelated offense.
254
  At a police 
lineup a little over a year later, L.J. identified the defendant as her 
assailant.
255
  The defendant was indicted for aggravated criminal sexual 
assault, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery.
256
 
At trial, the court accepted Lambatos as an expert witness in forensic 
biology and forensic DNA analysis.
257
  Lambatos described the process of 
analyzing and comparing DNA.  She testified that having one DNA expert 
rely on another DNA expert’s records in order to complete her work is a 
“commonly accepted” practice within the relevant scientific community.258  
She further testified that Cellmark was an “accredited crime lab,” and that 
the ISP lab routinely sent evidence to Cellmark.
259
 
When the prosecutor attempted to ask Lambatos for her expert opinion 
regarding the DNA profiles, Williams’s counsel objected, asserting that 
Lambatos could not rely on testing performed by another lab.
260
  The trial 
court judge allowed Lambatos to testify that the DNA profile received from 
Cellmark matched the defendant’s DNA profile from the blood sample in 
the ISP database.
261
  While the Cellmark report was never introduced into 
 
248 Id. 
249 Williams, 939 N.E.2d at 269. 








258 Id. at 2229–30.  
259 People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268, 272 (Ill. 2010). 
260 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2230. 
261 Id. 
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evidence, Lambatos was allowed to testify to her conclusions, which were 
informed by the report.
262
  Lombatos confirmed during cross-examination 
that her testimony depended on the profile produced by Cellmark and that 
she personally did not perform or observe the testing of the vaginal 
swabs.
263
  Cellmark’s status as an accredited lab gave Lombatos confidence 
that its work was reliable, even though she did not see any of the work that 
Cellmark put in to produce the DNA profile from the vaginal swabs.
264
 
When Lambatos finished testifying, the defense moved to exclude her 
testimony on Confrontation Clause grounds insofar as that testimony 
implicated events at the Cellmark lab.
265
  The prosecution, relying on 
Illinois Rule of Evidence 703, argued that even if an expert is not 
competent to testify to the facts on which his opinion is based, he is 
permitted to disclose those underlying facts.
266
  The trial judge agreed with 
the prosecution and admitted the evidence.
267




On appeal, the defendant argued that allowing Lambatos to testify to 
the testing completed by Cellmark violated his Sixth Amendment right to 
confront the witnesses against him.
269
  The Illinois Appellate Court 
disagreed, stating that the Confrontation Clause “does not bar the use of 
testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the 
matter asserted.”270  The Cellmark report, according to the court, was only 
offered to provide a basis for Lambatos’s opinion.271  The conviction was 
affirmed and the defendant appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.
272
  The 
Illinois Supreme Court upheld Williams’s conviction, also finding no Sixth 
Amendment violation because the Cellmark report was not being offered 
for the truth of its contents, but for the purpose of explaining the basis for 
Lambatos’s opinion.273  According to the Court, the only statement that the 
prosecution offered for the truth of the matter asserted was Lambatos’s own 
 
262 Williams, 939 N.E.2d at 272. 
263 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2230. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. at 2231. 
266 Id. (footnote omitted). 
267 Id. 
268 Id. 
269 See id. 
270 People v. Williams, 895 N.E.2d 961, 969 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (quoting Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004)). 
271 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2331. 
272 Id. 
273 Id. at 2231–32. 
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opinion, making unnecessary the presentation of the person who prepared 
the DNA profile at Cellmark.
274
 
A plurality of the United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding the 
defendant’s right to confrontation was not violated because (1) the 
Cellmark findings used against him were offered only to explain the basis 
for Lambatos’s expert opinion and not to prove the truth of the matters 
asserted therein, and (2) the Cellmark report, even if admitted into evidence 
(which it was not) was “very different from the sort of extrajudicial 
statements, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, and confessions, 
that the Confrontation Clause was originally understood to reach.”275  For 
the reasons discussed below, Williams leaves our Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence more confused than ever before.  It also offers few answers to 
the question of how the Court would treat a summary exhibit offered 
against a criminal defendant to prove the truth of the contents reflected 
within it. 
A. A FLAWED AND FRACTURED DECISION 
Williams is problematic for several reasons.  First, the decision takes 
the Court’s otherwise consistently (albeit rapidly) developing Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence and turns it on its head with a mishmash of partially 
overlapping opinions that leave everyone guessing how to determine when 
the confrontation right applies and when it does not.  The plurality, 
comprised of precisely the same Justices who so vehemently dissented in 
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, purports to uphold those decisions yet 
offends their reasoning at every step of its analysis.  Even worse, five 
Justices—including Justice Thomas, who concurred only in the judgment—
completely disagree with the plurality’s reasoning and analysis.276 
The Court’s conclusion that the Cellmark lab’s findings were not 
offered for their truth ignores the reality of so-called “basis evidence.”  If an 
expert testifies to a conclusion, and states that the conclusion is based on 
the assumption that a particular set of underlying facts is true, then the jury 
must accept those underlying assertions for their truth in order to agree with 
the expert’s conclusion.277  In Williams, since the validity of Lambatos’s 
 
274 People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268, 278 (Ill. 2010). 
275 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228. 
276 Id. at 2265 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“I call Justice Alito’s opinion ‘the plurality,’ 
because that is the conventional term for it.  But in all except its disposition, his opinion is a 
dissent: Five Justices specifically reject every aspect of its reasoning and every paragraph of 
its explication.”). 
277 See DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN & JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, THE NEW 
WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE § 4.10.1, at 196 (2d ed. 2011) (“If 
the jury believes that the basis evidence is true, it will likely also believe that the expert’s 
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conclusion ultimately turned on the truth of Cellmark’s statements, it is 
difficult to conceive how those statements could be considered to be offered 
for any other purpose.
278
 
Justice Thomas, who joined the plurality’s holding but rejected its 
reasoning, highlighted this flaw, stating “there was no plausible reason for 
the introduction of Cellmark’s statements other than to establish their 
truth.”279  Justice Thomas went on to refute the plurality’s suggestion that 
such an approach would undermine longstanding historical practice with 
respect to expert witnesses, noting that it was not until the Federal Rules of 
Evidence were adopted in 1975 that “the universe of facts upon which an 
expert could rely was expanded to include facts of the case that the expert 
learned out of court by means other than his own perception.”280  Today, the 
principal treatise on evidence calls the idea that “basis evidence” comes in 
not for its truth, but only to help the fact-finder evaluate an expert’s 
opinion, “very weak,” “factually implausible,” “nonsense,” and 
“fictional.”281 
To illustrate the logical shortcomings of the plurality’s position, the 
dissent poses a hypothetical involving a lay witness rather than an expert.
282
  
In this example, an eyewitness tells a police officer that the perpetrator had 
an unusual star-shaped birthmark over his left eye.
283
  If the police officer 
were to testify at trial about what the eyewitness told him, there would be 
no doubt that the testimony would violate the Confrontation Clause unless 
the eyewitness were unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity 
to cross-examine her.  The dissent then asks whether anything should 
 
reliance is justified; inversely, if the jury doubts the accuracy or validity of the basis 
evidence, it will be skeptical of the expert’s conclusions.”). 
278 Indeed the trial court, in announcing its verdict, expressly concluded that the 
defendant’s DNA matched the DNA in the semen recovered from the victim.  Williams, 132 
S. Ct. at 2258 n. 4. (Thomas, J., concurring).  Justice Thomas correctly points out that 
“[a]bsent other evidence, it would have been impossible for the trial court to reach that 
conclusion without relying on the truth of Cellmark’s statement that its test results were 
based on the semen from L.J.’s swabs.”  Id. 
279 Id. at 2256. 
280 Id. at 2257.  Prior to the adoption of the federal rules, “an expert could render an 
opinion based only on facts that the expert had personally perceived or facts that the expert 
learned at trial, either by listening to the testimony of other witnesses or through a 
hypothetical question based on facts in evidence.”  Id.  Justice Thomas points out that in 
such situations, “there was little danger that the expert would rely on testimonial hearsay . . . 
because the expert and the witnesses on whom he relied were present at trial.”  Id. 
281 KAYE, BERNSTEIN & MNOOKIN, supra note 277, § 4.10.1, at 196–98.  “One can 
sympathize with a court’s desire to permit the disclosure of basis evidence that is quite 
probably reliable, such as a routine analysis of a drug, but to pretend that it is not being 
introduced for the truth of its contents strains credibility.”  Id. 
282 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2269 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
283 Id. 
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change if the officer were to reword his testimony in the form of a 
conclusion: “I concluded that [the defendant] was the assailant because a 
reliable eyewitness told me that the assailant had a star-shaped birthmark 
and, look, [the defendant] has one just like that.”284  Obviously, couching 
the same testimony in the form of a conclusion would make no 
constitutional difference because “[i]t remains the case that the prosecution 
is attempting to introduce a testimonial statement that has no relevance to 
the proceedings apart from its truth.”285 
Even Justice Breyer, who joined in the plurality, wrote separately that 
he was “willing to accept the dissent’s characterization of the present rule as 
artificial,”286 leaving only three Justices clinging to the fiction that out-of-
court statements relied upon by an expert witness in forming his conclusion, 
when admitted at trial, are not being offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted. 
The plurality’s reasoning is also problematic because it would allow 
prosecutors to easily circumvent the Sixth Amendment requirement.  Where 
the declarant of a testimonial assertion against the defendant is unavailable, 
the government can avoid allowing the defendant to cross-examine the 
declarant by simply calling an expert witness to testify to conclusions based 
on the declarant’s findings.  Suddenly, statements that would otherwise be 
testimonial hearsay assertions against the defendant would become 
“underlying facts and data,” so long as the government can demonstrate that 
the testifying expert relied on the assertions to form her conclusions.  The 




While the prosecutors in Williams may not have intentionally sought to 
circumvent the Sixth Amendment requirement, that is effectively what 
happened.  Lambatos did not perform her own tests on the samples.
288
  She 
merely “agreed with Cellmark’s results” and “made her own visual and 
interpretive comparisons of [Cellmark’s report] . . . to conclude there was a 




286 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2246 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
287 Williams’s counsel made the argument that Lambatos was “merely a conduit for 
Cellmark’s report,” but the Illinois Supreme Court was unconvinced, finding that “[h]er 
testimony consisted of her expert comparison of the DNA profile in the ISP database with 
the DNA profile from the kit prepared by Cellmark.”  People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268, 
280 (Ill. 2010) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
288 See id. at 272. 
289 Id.  Even Justice Freeman, who concurred in the judgment of the court, appears to be 
skeptical about whether Lambatos did more than simply read results and compare them.  Id. 
at 283 (Freeman, J., concurring) (“Lambatos’ ‘testing’ in this case consisted of her own 
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constructing the DNA profile was performed by Cellmark.
290
  According to 
Lambatos, this process involved (1) isolating and extracting DNA from a 
sample; (2) amplifying the extraction to form a more workable sample; (3) 
measuring the length of an individual strand using a process called 
electrophoresis; and (4) using a computer to translate this measurement into 
a graph that represents the subject’s DNA.291  Lambatos did not perform or 
supervise these processes.
292
  She could attest to little more than the fact 
that Cellmark is an accredited lab and that she has never had a chain of 
custody or contamination problem with them in the past.
293
  Justice 
Freeman, who concurred in the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court, 
wrote that “Lambatos’ opinion regarding whether Cellmark followed proper 
guidelines at the time the DNA material was extracted and amplified was 
not based on anything other than her rank speculation that it ‘had to have 
been done’ solely because Cellmark was an accredited lab.”294  Justice 
Freeman also noted that “Lambatos admitted that Cellmark used procedures 
and standards that were different from those used by her own employer.”295  
While she testified that she “helped develop . . . proficiency tests to be 
administered to analysts at Cellmark,”296 “nothing in her testimony revealed 
that the analysts who performed the DNA extraction and amplification in 
this case had taken, let alone passed, the tests she had developed . . . .”297  
Nor could she testify that Cellmark ran the tests on Williams’s sample in 
accordance with the standards preferred by her employer, the ISP lab.
298
 
This is troubling because without an opportunity to cross-examine the 
lab analysts at Cellmark who actually constructed the DNA profile, 
Williams’s counsel was unable to probe the credibility or expertise of those 
analysts, or the veracity of the process employed in this particular test.  The 
prosecution had the opportunity to use the contents of the Cellmark report 
to bolster its case against Williams, but Williams could not even delve into 
whether Cellmark was accredited at the time the tests were performed.  Nor 
 
reading to match up the numbers generated on the computer charts, which was derived from 
Cellmark’s underlying scientific processes.”). 
290 Id. at 271 (majority opinion). 
291 Id. 
292 See id. at 272. 
293 Id.  
294 Id. at 284 (Freeman, J., concurring).  Justice Freeman ultimately joined the majority’s 
holding despite the fact that he “believe[d] the circuit court abused its discretion by 
admitting Lambatos’ testimony without proper foundation” because “the error . . . was 
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was Williams able to ascertain whether the lab analysts who constructed 
Williams’s DNA profile had passed the proficiency test developed by 
Lambatos.  By implying, as Justice Breyer does in his concurrence, that 
“perception, memory, narration, and sincerity” are the primary targets of 
cross-examination,
299
 the Court ignores the actual reasons a criminal 
defendant might want to cross-examine a lab analyst—credibility and 
competence.  Because Lambatos had no definite knowledge of Cellmark’s 
operations outside of the fact that it was an “accredited lab,” Williams’s 
attorneys had no opportunity to expose any lapses on Cellmark’s part, ask 
questions about Cellmark’s analysts’ proficiencies, or probe whether the 
analysts at Cellmark had tested the wrong vial, mislabeled the samples, or 
committed some other technical error. 
The plurality’s reasoning also offends Crawford and its progeny in a 
more fundamental way.  It collapses the constitutional inquiry under the 
Sixth Amendment into the evidentiary inquiry under FRE 703 (and 
Illinois’s equivalent).  The Court’s reasoning suggests that once the hearsay 
hurdle has been overcome, the right of confrontation does not apply because 
there is an evidentiary basis for admitting the testimony.  Crawford and its 
progeny make clear, however, that admissibility under the rules of evidence 
does not automatically satisfy the constitutional right to confrontation.  
Recognizing the plurality’s departure from the Court’s precedent, Justice 
Thomas warned that the rules of evidence should not “so easily trump a 
defendant’s confrontation right,” and reminded the Court that it has 
“recognized that concepts central to the application of the Confrontation 
Clause are ultimately matters of federal constitutional law that are not 
dictated by state or federal evidentiary rules.”300  The dissent echoed, “we 
do not typically allow state law to define federal constitutional 
requirements.”301  While the rules governing expert testimony allow experts 
to testify to evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible hearsay,
302
 it 
does not follow that the Constitution allows the same without confrontation.  
Crawford “made clear that the Confrontation Clause’s protections are not 
coterminous with rules of evidence.”303 
The remainder of the plurality’s reasoning is no sounder.  The Court 
goes on to hold that even if the Cellmark report were entered for its truth, it 
would not be testimonial because a DNA report “bears little if any 
resemblance to the historical practices that the Confrontation Clause aimed 
 
299 Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2249 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
300 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2256 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
301 Id. at 2272 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
302 Williams, 939 N.E.2d at 287. 
303 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2272 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
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to eliminate.”304  In support of this argument, the plurality submits that the 
Cellmark report is not testimonial because it was “not prepared for the 
primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual.”305  The origins of this 
test are unknown, even to the dissent.
306
  What it appears to be is a slightly 
mutated version of the “primary purpose test” articulated in Davis—that a 
statement offered against the accused is testimonial if the purpose of the 
statement was to further an investigation for criminal prosecution.
307
  Thus, 
the plurality ruled that the statements made against Williams were 
admissible by injecting a new requirement that the individual against whom 
the testimony is offered must have been specifically targeted for potential 
prosecution at the time the statement was made.  The plurality reasoned that 
a lab analyst processing DNA before a suspect has been identified has little 
motive to behave dishonestly.
308
  Again, this argument misses the point.  As 
the dissent notes, “the typical problem with laboratory analyses—and the 
typical focus of cross-examination—has to do with careless or incompetent 
work, rather than with personal vendettas.  And as to that predominant 
concern, it makes not a whit of difference whether, at the time of the 
laboratory test, the police already have a suspect.”309 
Lastly, the Court points to the following safeguards that it believes 
would prevent prosecutors from abusing its expert carve-out to the 
confrontation right: (1) the ability of trial courts to “screen out experts who 
would act as mere conduits of hearsay by strictly enforcing the requirement 
that experts display some genuine scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge that will help the trier of fact”;310 (2) the ability to “preclude[] 
[experts] from disclosing inadmissible evidence to a jury”;311 (3) the use of 
limiting instructions to explain to the jury that “out-of-court statements 
cannot be accepted for their truth, and that an expert’s opinion is only as 
good as the independent evidence that establishes its underlying 
premises”;312 and (4) triers of fact may not give any weight to an expert’s 
testimony “if the prosecution cannot muster any independent admissible 
 
304 Id. at 2244 (plurality opinion) (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1167 
(2011)). 
305 Id. at 2243. 
306 Id. at 2273 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Where that test comes from is anyone’s guess.”). 
307 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
308 See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2243–44. 
309 Id. at 2274 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
310 Id. at 2241 (plurality opinion). 
311 Id. 
312 Id. 
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evidence to prove the foundational facts that are essential to the relevance 
of the expert’s testimony.”313 
The court fails to explain how this is relevant to the Sixth Amendment 
inquiry.  The problem with this reasoning is that it attempts to safeguard the 
reliability of expert testimony, but ignores the Court’s precedent that the 
only constitutionally acceptable safeguard is Confrontation.
314
  Allowing 
admissibility under the Sixth Amendment to turn on whether the court 
believes cross-examination is necessary appears to be a throwback to the 
very reasoning the Supreme Court has rejected since Crawford.
315
  
Regardless of whether a court finds an expert’s testimony reliable, the Sixth 
Amendment demands that “that reliability be assessed in a particular 
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”316 
B. WILLIAMS’S RELEVANCE TO THE SUMMARY EXHIBIT INQUIRY 
 Even assuming the Court’s fragile holding withstands the test of time, 
it is hard to tell how Williams may impact the admissibility of summary 
exhibits under the Confrontation Clause.  Neither basis for the plurality’s 
decision applies in the summary exhibit context.  Summary exhibits, unlike 
underlying facts relied upon by expert witnesses (according to the 
plurality), are by definition offered to prove the truth of their contents.  This 
is what distinguishes summary exhibits under FRE 1006 from 
demonstrative exhibits offered under FRE 611(a).
317
  Unless the Court were 
to find a way to take its reasoning a step further, the expert testifying to a 
summary exhibit could not present the contents of a summary exhibit under 
the guise of “underlying facts and data.”  The exhibit would have to be 
entered into evidence, leaving a trial court to decide whether the maker of 
the assertions contained within that statement should be cross-examined. 
The second basis for the plurality’s decision—that even if admitted, 
the Cellmark lab report is not testimonial—also does not apply squarely to 
the case of summary exhibits.  A summary exhibit created during an 
investigation of a particular set of individuals with an eye toward possible 
litigation—as may often be the case in the forensic accounting context—
 
313 Id. 
314 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (“[The Confrontation Clause] 
commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular 
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”). 
315 Id. at 61 (“Certainly none of the authorities discussed above acknowledges any 
general reliability exception to the common-law rule [allowing for confrontation].  
Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of 
confrontation.”). 
316 Id. at 61. 
317 See infra Part II.C. 
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would survive the plurality’s modified primary purpose test.  If the target of 
the investigation is identified before or during the course of the 
investigation, the plurality’s concerns with dishonesty, misreporting, and 
intentionally faulty analysis would apply in full force.  And of course, the 
dissent’s concerns with incompetence, inexperience, and carelessness 
would also apply. 
Indeed, the grounds upon which the plurality attempted to distinguish 
its holding from Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming suggest that Williams does 
not preclude the exclusion of summary exhibits on confrontation grounds.  
The Court stated that “in [Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming], the forensic 
reports were introduced into evidence, and there is no question that this was 
done for the purpose of proving the truth of what they asserted: in 
Bullcoming that the defendant’s blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit 
and in Melendez-Diaz that the substance in question contained cocaine.”318  
The Court went on to explain that “nothing comparable happened” with the 
Cellmark report because its relevance only became apparent after the 
suspect had been arrested and his profile compared by the ISP lab.
319
  If this 
is where the Court seeks to draw the line, then summary exhibits offered 




The ultimate determination of whether summary exhibits receive 
constitutional scrutiny may turn on whether the Court finds the exhibit 
sufficiently “formal” to constitute a testimonial statement. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Crawford and its progeny have fundamentally transformed our Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Most of the Court’s post-Crawford 
Confrontation Clause cases have focused on either fleshing out whether a 
particular type of hearsay evidence is testimonial or determining whether 
the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the appropriate witness 
to guarantee his right to confrontation.  This is not surprising in light of the 
fact that Crawford’s most immediate effect was the separation of the 
procedural right to confrontation from the substantive guarantees of 
reliability and trustworthiness in FRE 803.  However, the scope of 
Crawford, especially in light of the Court’s decisions in Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming, should not be confined to its effect on the hearsay rule.  It 
 
318 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2240. 
319 See id. 
320 It is not inconceivable that a summary exhibit could be prepared without a set purpose 
or targeted individual in mind.  This Comment only presumes that it is more likely than not 
that such an exhibit would be created in a criminal case only after a purpose and defendant(s) 
have been identified. 
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should also demand confrontation where other forms of testimonial 
evidence are concerned, notwithstanding their admissibility under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. 
Though FRE 1006 does not appear in the federal rules as a hearsay 
exception, it allows for the admission of out-of-court statements being 
offered for the truth of their contents.  Such summaries are admissible 
because: (1) they serve the practical purpose of allowing the proponent to 
educate the jury on facts and evidence that would be too voluminous and 
complex without a summary, and (2) the requirement that the underlying 
voluminous information be admissible protects the opponent from the 
admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence.  However, the 
differences between FRE 1006 and the hearsay exceptions should not be 
considered relevant for confrontation purposes. 
Testimonial summary exhibits, such as the one that would result from 
the forensic accounting investigation described in Part II, are more than 
mere recapitulations of voluminous data.  They are statements that reflect 
the subjective determinations and discretionary judgment exercised by an 
investigator or forensic accountant.  The accountant determines which 
attributes are important, how the presence or absence of those attributes 
should be determined, and how the information should be organized, 
compiled, and presented in a compelling way.  Each layer of subjective 
interpretation and decisionmaking that goes into making this type of 
summary removes it further from the underlying data.  Refusing to allow a 
defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the individual or individuals 
who made the judgment calls reflected in such a summary would constitute 
a deprivation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the 
witnesses against him. 
Under Crawford, the fact that a piece of evidence is categorically 
admissible because the Federal Rules of Evidence deem that category of 
evidence trustworthy and reliable does not obviate the defendant’s right to 
cross-examine the proponent of that evidence if it is testimonial.
321
  
Crawford and its progeny do not limit testimonial evidence to statements 
that come from what most would consider traditional “witnesses” against a 
defendant;
322
 instead, testimonial evidence can come from any individual 
whose statement is being offered against a criminal defendant so long as 
that statement satisfies Davis’s “primary purpose” test;323 the primary 
 
321 Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 61, 68–69 (2004) (“[W]e decline to mine the record in search 
of indicia of reliability.  Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of 
reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually 
prescribes: confrontation.”). 
322 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2534 (2009). 
323 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
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purpose must be to “establish or prove past events potentially relevant to 
later criminal prosecution.”324  Summary exhibits, like many hearsay 
statements that fall within a “firmly-rooted” hearsay exception, fall into 
both of these categories.  Under Melendez-Diaz, they are deemed 
admissible because the underlying voluminous information is admissible, 
and they are prepared by witnesses for use against the accused.  Under 
modern Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, neither should be sufficient to 
deprive the defendant of the right to confront the preparer of the statement 
through cross-examination. 
In most cases, a summary exhibit is offered by its proponent through 
the testimony of a sponsoring witness.  This witness may have prepared the 
summary exhibit himself or, at the very least, would have a macro-
understanding of how the exhibit was derived from the underlying 
voluminous information.  However, oftentimes the witness who testifies is 
someone other than the individual who performed the investigative work 
that led to the creation of the summary.  If subjective decisionmaking is 
involved at the ground level, where the voluminous information is 
analyzed, these decisions are usually made by subordinates of the testifying 
witness who are not available for cross-examination by the defendant.  
While this is not fatal to the admission of summary exhibits insofar as the 
Federal Rules of Evidence are concerned, it raises serious constitutional 
concerns in light of Crawford, Melendez-Diaz, and Bullcoming. 
The Court will undoubtedly have to address the issue of whether 
testimonial summary exhibits, especially those that are created after the 
preparer exercises significant judgment in order to get from the underlying 
voluminous information to the summaries, are statements against a 
defendant that require the defendant to have the opportunity to cross-
examine the individual who prepared them.  Williams v. Illinois has 
muddied the Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, specifically with 
respect to the intersection of the Sixth Amendment and rules of evidence.  
The decision also offers few hints as to how the Court would decide a case 
involving a testimonial summary exhibit admitted for the truth of its 
contents.  Regardless, however, summaries are independent statements that 
exist apart from the underlying data, they are usually made with an eye 
toward litigation, they are offered as substantive evidence if admitted under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 1006, and they are often created after a potential 
defendant has been targeted.  Therefore, the dangers the Confrontation 
Clause was designed to prevent apply in full force.  For these reasons, if 
and when faced with an appropriate case, the Court should hold that the 
individual who made the decisions embodied in the summary exhibit should 
 
324 Id. 
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be made available for cross-examination in order to afford the defendant his 
Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. 
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